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PREDICTING ACQUIRING FIRMS: A NEW DISCOVERY FROM THE GROWTH-RESOURCE 
IMBALANCE HYPOTHESIS 
Jean-Mathieu Gareau 
The growth-resources hypothesis has been widely used empirically to develop models to predict takeover 
targets.  This hypothesis states that firms with low (high) growth and high (low) resources make good 
potential targets. In this thesis I test this hypothesis in the context of predicting future acquirers. Using 
binary, multinomial and two-step logit models, I document that a firm’s growth is actually the main factor 
leading to acquisitions, contrary to the generally accepted view that a firm’s cash position is one of the 
primary factors associated with future acquisition activity.  As such, the growth-resources imbalance 
hypothesis is partly validated: high growth-low resources firms are the most likely to make a bid while low 
growth-high resource firms which were expected to be the most likely to acquire, are, in fact, the least 
likely to take over other firms. These results are robust to different measures of the imbalance variables 
and are consistent with the market timing theory. In a hold out sample, I find that the binary logit models 
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Mergers and acquisitions are the events with the most impact in corporate finance and 
often represents the largest, and in some ways the riskiest, investment that a firm 
makes. One simply have to look at the scope some of the largest historical deals, such as 
the merger of AOL and Time Warner ($164 billions) or the purchase of Mannesman by 
Vodafone ($183 billions) to appreciate the scope of these events and the immense 
stakes of the related parties. Very high market attention is generated and investors can 
lock in spectacular profits if they are on the right side of the transaction before and at 
the announcement of a deal. Bearing that in mind, it is now well documented in the 
literature that the shareholders of the target firms reap the majority of the mergers and 
acquisitions’ rewards as the bidding firms usually end up holding the bag, gaining very 
little or losing in the long term. 
Given this information, it is quickly understandable that the real money in M&A is made 
with target firms and explains the extended empirical research on the subject: a 
significant number of researchers have developed models to forecast future takeover 
targets and then invest in a portfolio of companies that would generate the highly 
coveted abnormal returns (Palepu; 1982, 1986, Barnes; 1999, Powell; 2004, Hyde; 
2009). These studies rely on several generally accepted hypotheses about the 
characteristics of target firms that are incorporated in the models. Among these is the 
growth-resources imbalance hypothesis1 which states that a firm with low growth 
opportunities and high liquidity or low liquidity and high growth is most likely a good 
target: high liquidity firms are attractive due to their high cash position while high 
growth firms represent an opportunity for mature acquiring firms to expand. 
Acquirers have, in general, not received as much attention in empirical research as 
targets for the obvious reason that they do not create the significant short-term profit 
opportunities as targets do, which is still considered a puzzle. That being said, there is an 
increasing number of papers that consider firm and deal characteristics as well as 
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 It is sometimes also referred to as the growth-resources mismatch hypothesis. 
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corporate governance to try to pinpoint the underlying reasons why bidding firms to 
engage in what usually develops into a value destructing deal. This study builds on this 
stream of research. 
In this paper, I take the growth-resources imbalance hypothesis and apply it in the exact 
opposite way as it is used in the empirical literature: I use this hypothesis to build a 
model useful in predicting future acquirers. I argue that, even though firms with an 
imbalance make good acquisition targets, they are also likely to become acquirers. 
Consider a firm that has high liquidity and low growth: if it wants to maximize 
shareholder wealth, it can either pay out the cash to shareholders or it can acquire a 
company with a high level of growth. Conversely, a firm with high growth but no 
resources to fuel it will seek to either raise funds or acquire a cash-rich firm to reach a 
balance and emerge from the transaction in a better condition. In this thesis I focus on 
the acquiring decision rather than the financing/dividend decision. The acquisition 
decision hypothesis is tested with binary, multinomial and 2-step binary logit models 
using different definitions of growth and resources for robustness checks. 
The results in this study provide evidence that the growth-resources hypothesis holds 
partially for bidders. I find that the growth of the firm, calculated as the past 2 and 3 
years average sales growth is the main driver for a firm to make an acquisition. In my 
sample of 6976 bids from 1995 to 2008, firms which have high growth and low 
resources are the most likely to become acquirers, followed by those with high growth 
and high resources. The firms with low growth and high resources, which given the 
framework of this paper were expected to make an acquisition are actually found to be 
the least likely to become acquirers. I also find that the binary logit models have a 
higher prediction accuracy than the multinomial logit models. However, the 2-step 
binary logit model outperforms all other models. 
The work reported here is interesting for various reasons.  For scholars, the results 
reported open the door to further studies and a deeper understanding of the motives 
for acquisitions. These results also challenge some commonly held view on the 
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motivations of acquirers: contrary to popular beliefs, the main motivation for a firm to 
make a bid is not excess cash or liquidity (Harford;1999),  but rather it is growth. For 
practitioners in the M&A industry, like investment bankers, the models built here 
perform significantly better than chance and could provide additional support in their 
decisions regarding acquirers: these firms represent the main clients for investment 
bank, and a positive outcome generated by the models here would add significantly to 
the impact of the sales pitch of a consultant thrown at the prospected firm. If the 
models are proven useful and accurate enough to add even one signature from a 
customer for an investment bank, then it has its reasons to be used. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: section II reviews the vast literature 
of mergers and acquisitions, section III explains the hypothesis and section IV, the data 
and sample used. The methodology and models are reviewed in section V and VI, 
respectively and the results are presented in section VII. The prediction accuracy of the 
models is reported in section VIII. Section IX relates the estimated probability to make 
an acquisition to the deals’ abnormal returns and section X concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
a. On Targets 
When examining the empirical results of mergers and acquisitions, one can easily 
understand the interest in this aspect of corporate finance. The stock market reacts 
rapidly and significantly to merger announcements and creates many opportunities for 
investors, especially those with inside information, to emerge wealthier from these 
events. This is especially true for the targets of takeovers. During all merger waves, 
shareholders of target firms see their net worth increase significantly. For example, 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) find cumulative average abnormal returns of 20.89% from the 
announcement date to 20 days after takeovers between 1958 and 1978. Around the 
announcement date, all studies report very high abnormal gains: 6.2% during the 1963-
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1978 period (Eckbo;1983), 22.51% from 1980 to 1995 (Graham et al.;2002) and 21.2% in 
the 1990’s (Mulherin and Boone;2000). The same trend is observed using a longer event 
window around the announcement date. Eckbo(1983) finds a CAAR of 14.08% for the 
period    (-20;+ 10) and Lang et al.(1989) find a CAAR for targets of 40.3% during the (-
5;+5) window for their respective periods.  
Although the majority of the gains occur very close to the announcement date, 
increased stock price movements are apparent well before the event is publically 
announced. This run-up in price, as shown by Schwert(1996) starts as early as 42 trading 
days before the deal is announced. This run-up implies that the market partially 
anticipates such a deal as the event date approaches, whether it is from rumors, 
information leaks or, more importantly, increased insider trading. The post-
announcement returns are influenced by the deal’s attitude: hostile bids led to a CAAR 
of just under 32% while friendly bids triggered a CAAR of “only” 22% (Servaes; 1991) in 
the US for the 1972 to 1987 period. 
Given the size of the wealth effect documented in the empirical evidence, it is logical 
that investors would attempt to predict which firms are going to become targets and 
create a portfolio of such firms in order to capture these abnormal returns. The first 
probabilistic model of acquisition was developed by Palepu (1982) for this purpose and 
he used a logit model to predict takeover targets using accounting ratios. While 
performing better than chance, the Palepu model suffered from a lack of prediction 
ability in a random sample. Using a similar logit model approach, Hasbrouck(1985) finds 
that target firms characteristics are weighted towards a low Tobin’s Q ratio and, to a 
lesser extent, by financial liquidity. 
Several shortcomings in this matched sample logit methodology were identified and 
corrected by Palepu (1986). Common issues with the simple logit prediction model 
include: error rate estimates that inaccurately represent the performance of the model 
in the population, arising from the use of a non-random sample; and the use of arbitrary 
cutoff probability for the prediction tests that lead to hard-to-interpret error margins. 
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Examining the same hypothesis as in Palepu (1982) and the methodologically-enhanced 
binary logit model, Palepu (1986) shows that a portfolio of firms selected by the model 
fails to outperform the market. 
Barnes(1999) builds on Palepu’s work to predict takeover targets in the United Kingdom 
and make significant improvements: incorporating industry-adjusted ratios to correct 
for the usage of a holdout sample drawn from the estimation sample and choosing a 
cutoff point that minimizes the costs of misclassification of target firms. However, no 
significant improvement in performance is observed and he concludes that the use of 
financial ratios only is unlikely to outperform the market: given the diversity of merger 
motives and their relative importance over time, using a single cross-sectional model is 
unlikely be highly successful in predicting targets.  
   Despite the above conclusions, researchers have continued to examine the 
predictability of takeover targets – either by examining different samples or by 
improving the methodology. Arbel and Kim (1998) use a binary logit model to predict 
target firms in the hospitality industry, but with low predictive accuracy.  Adelaja et 
al.(1999) propose a two stage M&A model in the food industry: the probability of being 
targeted and the probability of being taken over. They build two logit models, one for 
each stage, to test their hypothesis. They find that financial ratios are good proxies for a 
firm to be targeted while governance (degree of officer control, attitude towards the 
transaction, number of prior bids, presence of litigations during negotiations and the 
involvement of both parties in the negotiation of a simultaneous bid) has a high impact 
on the probability of being taken over. The authors report that their models have 74.5% 
and 62.9% classification accuracy respectively.  
 Powell (2004) estimates a multinomial model using four logit equations to predict 
takeover targets of friendly and hostile deals using firms’ financial ratios. He shows that 
multinomial models have better predictive powers than binary models: when tested for 
abnormal returns, a portfolio of hostile deal targets identified by that model generates 
positive abnormal buy-and-hold returns. Hyde (2009) focuses on all deals since they 
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generate returns even if they are unsuccessful and used a sample of Australian firms. He 
argues that previous studies are biased since they exclude unsuccessful deals from their 
sample. He also argues that both type 1 and type 2 errors2 must be low: previous 
literature attributes low abnormal performance to the probability cutoff chosen for 
their portfolio due to the choice of a high type 2  errors (incorrectly classifying a firm as 
a target) in order to minimize type 1 errors (incorrectly classifying a target as a non-
target). His model is very successful at identifying takeover targets in the holdout 
sample and generates significant abnormal returns with robust results. 
While Palepu (1982, 1986) claims that that target-predicting models have very limited 
use, others have reported  that their models could well outperform the market in 
identifying future targets with prediction accuracies 47% (Powell;2001) and north of 
60% (Espahbodi and Espabohdi; 2003)3. Such claims can’t be easily dismissed because of 
the dynamic relationship between financial ratios and the likelihood of a firm being 
acquired. In comparison, forecasting bankruptcy, another important corporate event, is 
easier because firms going under are much more likely to exhibit the same patterns over 
time than likely target firms. While it is still unclear if a robust and efficient model can 
be built in order to consistently beat the market by predicting targets, many researchers 
have also worked on the other side of the M&A equation, the acquirers. 
b. On Acquirers 
Empirical evidence shows a puzzling disparity between bidder and target gains from 
takeovers: targets’ shareholders witness a significant wealth increase while acquirers’- 
shareholders make insignificant gains. Asquith (1983) reports abnormal returns of 0.2% 
for the window (-2;0) from 1962 to 1976 while Eckbo (1983) reports an abnormal 0.7% 
increase in shareholder wealth over the (-1,1) event window for the same study period  
(1963-1978). Using a sample from the 1980’s, Byrd and Hickman (1992) report a -1.23% 
                                                          
2
 Type 1 error refers to the model not identifying a takeover target in the portfolio while type 2 error is 
incorrectly identifying a non takeover target.  
3
 The prediction accuracy is calculated as (correctly predicted targets  + correctly predicted non-targets) / 
total sample size. 
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abnormal return for the (-1;0) window and, more recently, Lehn and Zhao (2006) find 
that, between 1990 and 1998, CEOs that made bad bids (average of -7.03% abnormal 
returns in the (-5; 40) window) are highly likely to be fired, while CEOs who are better 
bidders (0.28% CAAR) for the same window usually stay in the firm. Loderer and Martin 
(1992) find that on average, bidders in the 1966 to 1986 period did not underperform a 
portfolio of control firms over the five years following acquisition rather earning the 
required rate of return. Agrawal et al. (1992) find that bidders on the NYSE from 1955 to 
1987 lost 10% of stockholder values in the 5-years post-merger when acquiring NYSE or 
AMEX targets. In contrast, Gregory (1997) documents significant long term returns after 
completion of a merger or a tender offer from 1984 to 1992 in the United Kingdom. It is 
thus clear that, unlike targets, the evidence regarding acquirers’ performance is mixed. 
Firm Characteristics 
It has, however, been found that firms that become acquirers tend to outperform the 
market before the deal announcement. More specifically, Bradley and Sundaram (2004) 
found that in the 1990s, public acquirers outperformed the market by 50% and that 
acquisitions ‘’are the results of good performance’’. Bradley and Sundaram (2006) 
further confirm these preliminary results that good performance leads to acquisitions 
and not the opposite, and add that firms that make several acquisitions tend to perform 
better than infrequent bidders. Harford (1999) also documents that there is an 
increased probability of a firm becoming an acquirer if they show higher abnormal (pre-
bid) returns or higher sales growth. These results, suggesting that good performance 
leads to acquisition, are consistent with those of Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) and 
Roll (1986). 
Several studies try to explain the relatively poor returns that acquirers exhibit after 
acquisition. For example, Travlos (1987) finds that stock acquisitions lead to significant 
losses for bidding shareholders while cash bidders earned normal returns from 1972 to 
1981 in the US. He also notes that firms with poor returns tend to pay with equity. 
These results are independent of the type of takeovers. Pre-acquisition run-up is 
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significantly better if stocks are used as a method of payment (Bradley et al. 2004). This 
result is consistent with the market timing hypothesis which states that managers 
willingly use overvalued stocks to purchase real assets: the acquisition announcement 
sends a signal to shareholders that stocks are overvalued and thus the price reacts 
accordingly and drifts downwards. Lang et al. (1991) tested the relationship between a 
firm’s net present value (NPV) projects using Tobin’s Q as a proxy and the post-
acquisition returns of bidders. They found a negative relationship between cash flows 
and post-bid performance for firms with low Q ratio (bad NPV projects) but not for high 
Q firms.  
Intuitively, one should expect a significant relationship between a firm’s cash on hand 
and the performance of the acquisition. Hyde (2009) suggests that cash rich firms 
engage in value decreasing transactions and finds that they destroy seven cents of value 
per dollar of cash and short term investments held when engaging in mergers and 
acquisitions. He also documents that these firms are more likely to make diversifying 
acquisitions and their targets are less likely to attract other bidders. His results are 
consistent with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory where managers are willing 
to engage in value-destroying behaviors rather than paying the extra cash-flows to their 
shareholders.  Smith and Kim (1994) show that bidders with high free cash flow tend to 
pay too much for their targets and that such firms show lower returns when they  
acquire targets with low financial slack , while slack-poor acquirers buying high cash 
flow targets tend to show higher returns. Oler (2008) also finds that a high level of cash 
in acquiring firms is strongly and negatively influencing post acquisition returns.  
Moeller et al. (2004) focus on firm size to predict post-acquisition returns and find a 
strong size effect in their sample: while the equally-weighted returns at the 
announcement date is positive (1.1%), the acquirers showed an average loss 25.2M$ 
after controlling for the M&A activities in their respective industries. These results show 
that, although acquirers show a positive return on average over the period 1980 to 
2001, some deals involving very large firms destroy enough value to affect the results of 
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the whole sample. This effect may have started in this specific sample period as, before 
the 1980s, firms were less likely to be taken over: during those pre-80s years, the most 
powerful anti-takeover measure was firm size because of the relative difficulty of 
financing very large acquisitions. The decade of the 80s saw financial innovations such 
as “junk bonds in the US and mezzanine debt in the UK” that helped companies 
“overcome the traditional obstacles in the financial markets and acquire very large 
targets”4.  Chatterjee (2004) tested the effect of this past “immunity” but failed to find 
improved performance in acquirers buying such targets compared to both other 
acquirers and to the market. Thus, in order to acquire targets of this magnitude, it is 
easily arguable that the size of the acquirers must strongly influence the probability of 
becoming an acquirer.  
Another characteristic that has been shown to affect firms’ bidding decisions is their 
level of research and development. The market tends to incorrectly evaluate future 
synergies for merging firms when the acquisitions involve high technology firms than in 
other type of deals (Luo; 2005). To address this issue, Kallunki and Pykkö (2008) test a 
sample consisting exclusively of technology deals between 1992 and 2004 where the 
acquirer was in the United States, and found that the level of bidder R&D is positively 
related to long term abnormal returns, more precisely to abnormal returns in the 3rd 
year following acquisition. It is also argued that this misevaluation is an undervaluation 
of future cash flows by investors due to information asymmetry at the time of the 
transaction. 
In addition to trying to link quantitative measures to merger performance, research has 
also examined the influence of qualitative variables, such as those measuring corporate 
governance, on acquirer performance. Even though upper management is theoretically 
working for the shareholders, they are the ones involved in the negotiations on the 
terms of the deals, and should have a direct effect on the performance of the firm post-
announcement.  Datta et al. (2001) examine the relationship between executive 
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 Chatterjee (2004) 
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compensation and stock performance around acquisitions and find that the managers’ 
equity-based compensation is strongly and positively related to the acquiring firm’s 
stock performance around and after acquisition announcement. In contrast, Reis (2008) 
finds no evidence of a relationship between managerial incentives and shareholders’ 
wealth increase: both target and bidder CEOs’ incentives show no correlation with their 
respective shareholders’ wealth. However, he does find that managerial incentives 
strongly influence the success of a takeover. Furfine & Rosen (2009) find a relationship 
between CEO option-based compensation and an increase in acquirer’s default risk 
following a diversifying merger, and the effect is greater when the firm exhibits poor 
stock performance prior to the bid. Malmendier and Tate (2002) examine CEO behavior 
for signs of “overconfidence”, notably, if they regularly buy shares and if they refrain 
from exercising in-the-money options of their own firm. They found that overconfident 
CEOs have a higher tendency to invest in a project the higher the firm’s cash flows and 
the more funds they have at their disposal. This finding is consistent with the view that 
managers prefer to invest in bad projects rather than distributing the funds to their 
shareholders and that cash rich firm engage in value-destroying transactions. 
Jaffe et al. (2009) show that the CEO, as an individual, is related to the performance of 
bidding firms:  good performance persists when the same CEO makes multiple bids and 
the second deal of a firm shows an earnings increase of 1.02% compared to firms with a 
previously unsuccessful bid that kept its CEO. This translates into a mean increase of 
$175M in value creation “for the shareholders of an average sized bidder”5. While 
economically significant, these results do not account for another important 
determinant of firm performance: the board of directors. The CEO of a firm doesn’t act 
on his own and is helped by the firm’s directors. Thus, in the same way that a 
competent CEO can make better acquisitions, it is expected that a better board of 
directors helps in the decisions made by the CEO and should, therefore, influence 
performance. Schonlau and Vir Singh (2009) document this relation between the whole 
board of directors and the performance of a merger and find that more central boards 
                                                          
5
 Jaffe et al. (2009) 
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(boards with better connections with other boards) earn significantly better post-
acquisition returns on average than for less central boards.  They also report a positive 
relationship between board centrality and the probability of engaging in mergers and 
acquisitions, both as a target or as an acquirer, and of using cash as a means of 
payment.  The richer the board’s external connections with other firm’s top 
management the better the information surrounding the transaction thereby resulting 
in better performance.   
 
Deal Characteristics 
Rather than focusing on the mode of payment and pre-bid acquirers’ variables, a 
growing body of research looks at the type of firms that are sought. The results of these 
studies show some consistency: Conn et al. (2003) find that UK public acquirers of 
domestic and cross-border public targets generated negative abnormal post 
announcement returns while deals involving private targets saw positive announcement 
returns and no abnormal post-transaction returns. Fuller et al. (2001) found that, in a 
sample of frequent acquirers (5 or more bids in a 3 years span), shareholders of firms 
that acquire a public target earn significantly negative returns where these returns are 
significantly positive for private targets and subsidiaries of public firms.  This suggests 
that bidders pay a relatively lower price in a less liquid market. Bradley and Sundaram 
(2006) further confirm these results and find that the size of the firm isn’t the most 
important variable in determining how the market reacts at announcement, but rather 
the public status of the target firm. Faccio et al.(2006), in their study on Western 
European countries from 1996 to 2001, find that buyers lose an average of 0.38% when 
buying listed targets and gain 1.48% when acquiring unlisted targets.  These findings 
were confirmed by Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) but they also show that acquirers that buy 
unlisted targets suffer from a substantial loss in the long run. They hypothesize that 
these results may be because of the investors’ optimism towards the limited and biased 
information available at the transaction announcement for the unlisted target firms. 
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Bradley and Sundaram (2004) find similar results for US acquirers in the 1990s, where 
the market reacted positively to the acquisition of non-public targets while reacting 
negatively to the acquisition of public targets with stocks. The notion that acquisition 
follows performance is consistent with Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2003) who show that 
mergers are cyclical and tend to occur in waves.  
When making an acquisition, firms can choose between diversifying their activities and 
consolidating their position in their respective industry. Berger and Ofek (1995) argue 
that two benefits to diversification exist:  a greater tax shield derived from the higher 
debt capacity and tax savings resulting from the losses of unprofitable segments that 
offset profits of other segments.  They examine the diversification effect on firm value 
and document an average of 13% to 15% value loss from diversifying during the period 
from 1986 to 1991. They also point out that the tax savings are far too small in 
comparison in the average loss of value to be an incentive to diversify. 
Applying the notion of diversification in M&As, Matrynova and Renneboog (2006) test 
the difference between diversifying deals and industry-related acquisitions in Europe 
during the 1990s, and find a bidding firm’s CAAR of 0.45% for the former type of deals 
and 0.98% for the latter. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that diversifying acquisitions, 
despite being as successful as their non-diversifying counterparts, are more likely to be 
divested following large takeovers. They also document that announcement returns 
predict the following divestitures: they are significantly lower for firms that later make 
unsuccessful divestitures than for those who later make successful ones or none at all. 
They also support the view that a divestiture doesn’t mean a failed merger since 56% of 
the transactions that end in divestitures don’t report a loss on the subsequent sale. 
Betton et al. (2008) summarize the performance of acquirers: bidders gain the most 
when they are small and acquire private targets (average CAAR of 6.46%) while they 
lose the most when they are big and acquire public targets with stocks (average CAAR of 
-2.21%). While stock payment was once thought to be the most important factor to 
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predict (negative) performance, firm size and target public status appear to have the 
greatest impact on acquiring firm stockholder returns.  
 
c. On Mergers’ Long-Run Performance. 
In general, around the announcement day, targets’ shareholder wealth increases and 
acquirers’ make insignificant returns resulting in generally positive total gains. Thus, we 
would expect that mergers are value creating in the long-run, given the predictions of 
the market when the deal is announced. However when examining at the long-term 
post-merger performance, this conclusion is far from accurate. Acquirers’ stock prices 
generally drift downwards and tend to underperform the market. This implies that 
synergy gains are generally overvalued by the market and the managers at 
announcement. If such is the case, then the (bad) acquirers risk becoming targets and 
being acquired because of poor performance. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show that 
acquirers that make such value reducing deals tend to become target themselves, 
consistent with the Jensen and Ruback (1983) view on the disciplinary role of the 
takeover market. However, Offenberg et al. (2009) find evidence that buying these bad 
bidders in an attempt to recuperate the destroyed value is generally unsuccessful and 
acquirers lose more the worse the bidder is. Accurately assessing the long-run 
performance of merger is tricky but important and can help shed light on the causes of 
the generally poor performance.  
Measuring long-term post-merger returns is ambiguous and highly dependent on the 
estimation model provided to predict the benchmark. Barber and Lyon (1997), argue 
that the most adequate benchmark measure is to compute the returns on a portfolio of 
similar firms matched by the size and book-to-market ratio for bidding and target firms 
before the takeover. Using this method, several studies looked at the long term merger 
performance. For example: Loughran & Vijh (1997) report underperformance when 
stocks are used as a means of payment as opposed to cash, and Mitchell & Stafford 
(2000) report generally negative long run performance. More recently, Moeller et al. 
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(2005)   did not find evidence of significant abnormal long run performance after 
mergers. 
Several hypotheses for long run underperformance have been proposed. The first view, 
supported by Shleifer & Vishny (2003) and Baker et al. (2007), is that the share price 
drift is a slow and simple correction of the market’s overvaluation of the combined 
entity. This view emanates from behavioral finance and contradicts any form of market 
efficiency but the weak form, suggesting that the market adapts slowly as new 
information becomes available. 
A second view on the long run performance topic arises from the theory that mergers 
and acquisitions are a response to industry shocks such as an increase in foreign 
competition and financial innovations (Mitchell and Mulherin; 1996). Andrade and 
Stafford (2004) add that these shocks are split between industry-specific and firm-
specific events that both affect the likelihood of a merger while Andrade et al. (2001) 
suggest that these shocks explain why mergers and acquisitions tend to be “industry-
clustering”, especially during the last 30 years. Because the acquisition is a consequence 
of the firm’s changing environment, Harford (2004) argues that once the firms are 
merged, they perform better than they would have if they had both remained 
independent, and that this “improved” performance can still be worse than the 
observed pre-merger performance. 
The third hypothesis is that the underperformance of mergers and acquisition is an 
illusion created by the methodology used to compute the returns. Betton et al. (2008) 
investigate this issue and find that, using the buy-and-hold matched firm methodology, 
merged firms underperform, on average, their matched firms in value-weighted and 
equal-weighted estimates. However, when using the rolling portfolio technique in the 
same sample, they can’t reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns. They also 
find evidence that seriously weakens the results reported by the buy-and-hold 
methodology as being significantly negative abnormal returns. Thus, it seems that the 




a. Takeover Motivations 
Based on the empirical evidence reviewed thus far, acquiring firms’ managers appear to 
overestimate the benefits of mergers or acquisitions and thus the events generally 
result in a wealth loss for acquirers’ shareholders. Bearing this in mind, why would 
managers engage in value-reducing deals? There are three general motives suggested in 
the literature: synergy, agency and hubris. 
Synergies imply that the combined firms should benefit from the transaction because 
they will perform better together rather than independently. Synergies can arise from 
increased buying power and thus lower costs, better use of resources and technology in 
the combined firm as well as increased distribution networks, among others. When the 
motive to merge is synergies, management is expected to act in the interests of the 
shareholders by trying to maximize their wealth.  
Agency theory implies that managers would use excess liquidity to invest in a negative 
NPV project (in this case, an acquisition) rather than distributing the extra cash flows to 
the shareholders, or to repay a portion of the outstanding debt. Several motives for 
such a behavior exist: managers of a firm can acquire a target to diversify their personal 
portfolio; they can also do it to increase the firm’s dependence on their own set of skills 
through the acquisition of a target specifically located in the CEO’s managing specialty 
that may or may not be related to the acquirer’s core business. Another motive is 
referred to as empire-building, where the sole goal is to increase the firm’s size and the 
personal power of the CEO. Such actions are value-destroying for the firms in which 
these behaviors are witnessed and generally lead to a transfer of wealth from acquiring 
shareholders to acquiring managers and target shareholders. If agency is the motivation 
for takeovers, then management acts for its own interest and not the shareholders’. 
The third motive, Hubris, suggest that managers engage in M&A due to overconfidence 
in their estimations and their overoptimistic outlook on the deals specifics and errors of 
judgment. However, measuring hubris is very ambiguous: forecasting errors are 
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common for management and especially in M&As, since even the manager with the 
most evil intentions can make a misjudgment when appropriating his shareholder’s 
wealth to himself. In this study, forecasting errors are expected to arise for all firms 
meaning that hubris should be present in the whole sample. 
b. Framework & Hypothesis 
This paper focus on a well-documented hypothesis in mergers and acquisitions: the 
growth-resource imbalance. While it has been used in the literature to predict future 
takeover targets (for examples see: Palepu, 1986; Ambrose & Megginson; 1992, Barnes; 
1999, Powell; 2004), the underlying concept of the mismatch between the available 
resources in a firm and growth potential is also relevant for acquirers: for a firm to be 
efficient and prosper, it needs to maintain a balance between available growth 
opportunities and liquidity to materialize them. Their liquidity can be measured as the 
cash and liquid investments on hand, and the ability to borrow through leverage. Thus, 
very liquid firms will have relatively low leverage and high cash on hand. Another option 
to obtain liquidity is to issue more stock, provided the dilution from the issue is 
perceived as reasonable by the market.  
If a firm doesn’t have the necessary resources or access to resources to fuel its high 
growth and positive NPV projects, it can either renounce to them or enter the takeover 
market to acquire a target firm with high liquidity or debt capacity to compensate for 
their lack of funds. The opposite is also applicable: a firm with very high cash reserves 
and/or availability but no growth opportunity can correct for this imbalance by acquiring 
a low-cash, high-growth firm and correct the mismatch.  
The motivations of managers to engage in mergers and acquisitions are directly linked 
to this concept. Managers of cash-rich firms have more freedom to use the funds for the 
good (or bad) of their shareholders than managers of low-liquidity firms: they may 
choose to acquire a target for reasons other than to correct the imbalance by which 
they benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholders. In contrast, managers of 
high-growth, cash-dry firms acquiring high resource firms are less likely to make a “bad” 
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deal because of the increased control mechanisms created by issuing either stock or 
debt to finance the bid.  
Hypothesis: The importance of the growth-resource imbalance is directly linked to the 
probability of a firm becoming an acquirer. Managers of firms with low growth and 
high resources are expected to exhibit agency behaviors and thus be the most prone 
to acquisition. Firms in the high growth-low resource tiers, where managers are 
expected to be motivated by synergy in acquisitions, are also expected to be the most 
likely candidates to acquire another firm. 
In order to test the hypothesis, binary, multinomial and 2-step binary logit models are 
used. Regressions are built by quantifying the growth-resource imbalance as a ratio, as 
well as dummy variables. Tests are run on the whole sample and on the four subsamples 
of firms classified by their respective growth and resource level. Figure 1 shows the 
characteristics of the firms included in each subsamples as well as the expected 
probability that these firms will become acquirers P(A) or targets P(T). It is expected that 
firms that don’t exhibit an imbalance have a low probability of taking over other firms 
while those who do are more likely to become active in the takeover market. 
Figure 1. Growth-Resources Matrix and Expected 
















Low P(A) High P(A) 




Moderate P(A) Low P(A) 
High P(T) Low P(T) 
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IV. Sample and Data Collection 
 
a. Collection 
The sample in this study was drawn from three different databases: Compustat for the 
accounting variables, SDC for the Mergers and Acquisitions dataset and CRSP for stock 
returns. The sample period is from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2008. The 1995-
2005 period is used as the estimation sample while the 2006-2008 period is used as the 
holdout sample to test the predictive abilities of the models developed in the paper. 
All North-American firms were retrieved from the Compustat database, even if they 
became inactive during the studied period, for a total of 23 355 companies. From SDC, I 
extracted all US acquirers seeking to do a merger or gain a majority interest in a target 
– in other words, deals where the acquirer was seeking control of the target.  
Transactions where the bidder was in the financial or utility industry were excluded. The 
total number of bids extracted from the SDC database is 22 784. 
 
b. Merging 
i.Sdc and CRSP 
I first matched the SDC database with the CRSP to get the companies’ IPERM numbers. 
The matching was done by an acquiring company’s CUSIP number. Because SDC and 
CRSP use 6-digit and 8-digit CUSIPs respectively, I matched using both the 6 digit CUSIP 
and appending the digits “10”, “11”,”20” and “30” to obtain as many  matches as 
possible. Then I matched again using the SDC 6 digit CUSIP by removing the last two 
numbers of the CRSP 8 digits CUSIPs. 
I then manually checked if the IPERMS matched were identical. For the 150 that 
weren’t, I manually checked them and only kept the bids on common equity, defined by 
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the share codes 10 or 11. All other observations were removed. After these steps, there 
were 14679 deals in the combined SDC/CRSP database. 
 
ii. SDC and Compustat 
Compustat reports annual financial data according to fiscal year rather than calendar 
year. Sometimes, the year end reported by Compustat can extend as late as May of the 
next calendar year. To correct this problem and facilitate the matching of financial data 
with transactions and returns, I created another variable, “Year”, which is given a 
numerical value of the company’s fiscal year. For example, in 2008, a company with a 
fiscal year ending in May 2009 is given the value 2008 for the “Year” variable. For a 
company with a fiscal year ending between June and December, the Variable “Year” 
takes the value of the current year.  
I matched the SDC/CRSP database using the 8 digit CUSIPs, cutting one digit from the 
Compustat 9 digit numbers. This matching process eliminated 3546 deals, further 
narrowing the sample to 11 133 transactions. 
 
c. Final Sample 
With the complete sample combining all three databases, I removed all financial and 
utilities firms from the Compustat report since utility firms act under regulations not 
present elsewhere in the corporate world while the financial institutions use different 
ratios to measure economic performance than typical firms. These firms are also under 
different regulations that affect their managerial decisions which could alter the results 
of the study if kept in the sample. All SIC codes starting with either 4 or 6 are classified 
as financial and utilities respectively and were accordingly removed. To make sure none 
of them were spared I also used the GICS codes, starting with 40 for financial and 55 for 
utilities and removing them from the database. 
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Because this study deals with acquisition of common shares, the limited partnerships 
(LP) and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) were also dropped. The final sample consists of 
6976 acquisitions6, 13 860 firms, both acquirer and non-acquirer, and is spread across a 
14 year period. 
d. Comparison 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the population of acquirers taken from SDC 
database and Table 2 summarizes the same characteristics for the sub-sample of 
acquirers that matched with the Compustat database. The ‘’matched’’ sample is very 
similar to the aggregate pool in terms of deal attitude, the target firm’s public status and 
the lack of tender offers and mergers. The mean values of transactions are $477.31M 
for the matched sample and $475.14M for the aggregate sample while the medians are 
$53.72M and $33.75M respectively. The matched sample has a higher proportion of 
high value deals while the population mean is driven by some extremely big deals. 
Transaction values range from $0.007M to $89167.72M for the matched sample and 







                                                          
6
 My filtering criterion for the bidding firm was that they have to be public firms for the accounting 
information to be available. However, in the final sample, there are still 105 firms that SDC classified as 




TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Population of SDC Acquirers 
# of Deals=22784 # of Firms=13660 
Status 
Completed Withdrawn Other 
17710 1428 3646 
77.730% 6.268% 16.002% 
Attitude 
Friendly Hostile Other 
22151 144 489 
97.222% 0.632% 2.146% 
Target Public Status 
Public  Private Other 
5131 13919 3734 
22.520% 61.091% 16.389% 
Value Of Transaction 
($M) (N = 12458) 
Mean Median Min ; Max Skewness Kurtosis 

















TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Acquirers in the Matched Sample 
# of Deals = 6976 # of Firms=2835 
Status 
Completed Withdrawn Other 
5914 470 592 
84.776% 6.737% 8.486% 
Attitude 
Friendly Hostile Other 
6711 70 195 
96.201% 1.003% 2.795% 
Target Public 
Status 
Public  Private Subsidiary Other 
2171 3775 897 133 
31.121% 54.114% 12.858% 1.907% 
Value Of 
Transaction ($M)  
(N =5224) 
Mean Median Min ; Max Skewness Kurtosis 












The main difference between the samples concerns the frequency of firms attempting 
multiple acquisitions. In the matched sample, 49.67% of the firms attempted more than 
one acquisition while only 28.73% of firms in the aggregate sample made a bid twice or 
more. This suggest that there is a size effect that arises from the fact that the firms 
matched with Compustat are firms that have to report their financial information and, in 
general, are the larger  firms.  
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To verify the size effect, I calculated the average and median firm size, using the firm’s 
market capitalization as a proxy, for the companies that matched with Compustat and 
those that did not (the unmatched sample). The computation was done using values 
extracted from CRSP 41 days before the first bid of a firm in the sample period. 
 The average and median firm size for the matched sample are $1754.825M and 
$344.418M, respectively, while these values are $1388.072M and $145.368M for the 
unmatched sample. While the average size isn’t overwhelmingly different for both 
samples, the median is more than twice as big in the matched sample: a substantial 
difference in firm size between both groups thus exists. 
 The ratio of the transaction value over firm size gives a better idea of the relative 
importance of a bid for a firm in both samples.  The average transaction in the 
unmatched sample is twice as important as in the matched sample when compared to 
the acquirer’s market capitalization (70.84% and 35.28% respectively). The same pattern 
is seen in the median values: 23.77% and 11.71% for the unmatched and the matched 
samples, respectively. This means that the deals in the sample that wasn’t matched with 
Compustat are twice as important relative to firm size as in the matched sample. This 
could explain why there are more firms making multiple acquisition attempts in the 
sample used for this study, since the deals are relatively less important for the firms. 









Table 3. Comparison of Deal Value Relative to 
Firm Size in the Compustat Matched and the Non 
Matched Samples 
    Panel. A MATCHED SAMPLE (G=Billion, M=Million) 
N= 1834 
   
Market CAP 
Mean Median Min ; Max 
$1.75G $344.418M {$420320 ; $144,291G} 
    
Transaction 
Value/Market CAP 
0.3528 0.1171 - 
    
Panel B. UNMATCHED SAMPLE (G=Billion, M=Million) 
N=1180 
   
Market CAP 
Mean Median Min ; Max 
$1.39G $145.368.92M {$402500 ; $184.25G} 
    
Transaction 
Value/Market CAP 
0.7084 0.2377 - 
 
e. Event Study 
This is a study about mergers and acquisitions that focus on acquirers based on certain 
characteristics of bidding firms. Because the firms were filtered in the aforementioned 
way, certain differences may appear in my sample of deals compared to the aggregate 
sample obtained from SDC. For this reason, I ran an event study on my matched sample 
and on the unmatched sample to measure the extent to which the estimation sample 
suffers from selection bias. 
The estimation period of the study ranges from 41 trading days before announcement 
to 126 trading days after announcement. Six different event windows are used to 
measure the impact of the acquisition announcement. For each window, the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns is calculated for both the matched and the unmatched samples by 
adjusting the firms’ return with the market return and using the equally weighted index. 
Results for the firms’ first bids only are also reported. Panel A. and Panel B of table 4 
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summarize the results for the matched and unmatched samples, as well the significance 
of the returns. 
TABLE 4. CARs From the Samples by Event Window 
Panel A. Matched Sample 
 
All Bids N=6264 
 
Only 1st Bid N=2522 
Window Min % Max % Mean % Median % 
 
Min % Max % Mean % Median % 
(-41,-32) -3.239 5.174 -0.002 -0.004   -3.239 5.174 0.007 -0.001 
(-31,-22) -1.055 1.181 -0.001 -0.003   -1.055 1.181 0.001 -0.003 
(-21,-12) -0.934 1.87 -0.001 -0.004   -0.917 1.87 0.001 -0.002 
(-11,-2) -1.007 1.936 0.001 -0.002   -0.789 1.245 0.003 0 
(-1,1) -0.757 5.215 0.008 0.002   -0.653 5.215 0.016 0.004 



















(-41,-32) 6251 0.26% 0.06% 2926:3325 0.469 1.649** -0.798 
(-31,-22) 6251 0.33% 0.46% 2958:3293 3.345*** 2.099** 0.0013 
(-21,-12) 6251 0.46% 0.39% 2978:3273 3.284*** 2.238** 0.0081 
(-11,-2) 6250 0.79% 0.42% 3032:3218** 2.910*** 4.746*** 1.9** 
(-1,1) 6250 0.95% 0.70% 3219:3031*** 9.282*** 10.851*** 6.637*** 
(2,126) 6249 -8.04% -5.61% 2263:3986*** -11.473*** -14.297*** -17.572*** 










Panel B. Unmatched Sample 
  All Bids N=3373   Only 1st Bid N=1765 
Window Min % Max % Mean % Median % 
 
Min % Max % Mean % Median % 
(-41,-32) -6.831 3.66 0.018 0   -6.831 3.66 0.039 0.013 
(-31,-22) -1.45 2.041 0.004 -0.004   -1.45 2.041 0.008 -0.004 
(-21,-12) -5.729 1.656 0.002 -0.005   -5.729 1.656 0.011 -0.004 
(-11,-2) -3.713 1.784 0.015 0.003   -3.713 1.784 0.019 0.004 
(-1,1) -1.112 1.936 0.024 0.004   -1.112 1.936 0.037 0.007 



















(-41,-32) 3358 -0.29% -0.06% 1494:1864** -0.225 -0.949 -1.858** 
(-31,-22) 3359 0.78% 0.84% 1580:1779 3.285*** 2.551*** 1.103 
(-21,-12) 3360 1.44% 1.58% 1612:1747*** 6.47*** 3.66*** 1.944** 
(-11,-2) 3360 2.92% 2.22% 1675:1685*** 8.308*** 9.118*** 4.375** 
(-1,1) 3359 2.75% 1.86% 1747:1612*** 13.284*** 16.440*** 6.883*** 
(2,126) 3359 -11.31% -9.28% 1047:2312*** -10.3*** -10.489*** -17.347*** 
*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Prior to the bid announcement, the unmatched sample’s mean CAR outperforms the 
matched sample, especially in the (41,-32), the (-21,-12) and the (-11,-2) windows.  
Around the day of the announcement, the unmatched sample still outperforms the 
matched sample with a mean CAR three times as high.  In the (-41,-32) window, and 
around the announcement date, the range of CARs in the matched sample is much 
narrower than the unmatched one, while the mean is significantly lower.  
When we isolate the firms’ first bids, the mean CAR becomes higher for each window 
except after the bid in the matched sample. The same pattern exists for the median 
CAR, suggesting that first bids are generally more successful than subsequent bids. 
When both samples of 1st bids are compared, the range of CARs for the unmatched 
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sample is wider, while the mean CAR is higher for each window. The firms in the 
unmatched sample, whether they are first bidders or including all bids, perform better, 
on average, than the sample used in this study, the exception being for the window 
after the bid (2,126), where it performs slightly worse. 
To further expand on the event study, results of the daily event study were extracted. 
Figure 2 shows the CARs from both samples while Figure 3 plots the difference in 
abnormal returns from both samples on a daily basis. From the first graph we clearly see 
that stock price performance peaks on the day following the announcement for both 
samples, and then dives into negative territory as time goes on. Both samples follow the 
same trend, although the unmatched sample shows higher volatility and steeper 
movements in stock prices. 
The second graph compares the difference in performance between both samples. Prior 
to the deal announcement, the companies in the unmatched sample clearly outperform 
the matched sample. However, once the bid is announced, the unmatched companies 
show CAARs declining at a faster rate than the matched sample. A possible explanation 
to this is the size effect identified in the samples: firms from the non-matched sample 
are smaller on average and necessarily receive less coverage from analysts. Without 
extensive coverage, the acquisition comes as a bigger surprise than for bigger firms, 
hence the sharp spike at the announcement day. This lack of coverage brings less 
interest in the firms’ stocks, making it drift lower once the transaction is closed.  
Even though the results of the event study on both samples are not identical, they are 
similar enough to conclude that no major bias exists, except from the more negative 
long term CARs of the unmatched sample and the size effect. One should bear in mind 
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Figure 3. Difference Between CARs of the 





F. ROA Trend 
This section investigates the trend of firms’ return on assets (ROA) prior to their first bid 
to see if future bidders outperform their non-acquiring peers. Results were computed 
for both 3 and 5 years prior to a firm’s first bid. In order to be included in the results, the 
firms’ ROA had to be available for each year prior to the deal. For example, for the 5 
year trend, because the sample ranges from 1995 to 2008, only firms that did a first deal 
in the year 2000 or later were used to compute the results, since 5 years of data was 
available. The same logic was used for the 3 year trend. The following graphs show the 
results for both 3 years and 5 years trend. Figure 4A. reports the mean ROA and Figure 
4B., the median ROA. Since the values’ range was extreme, I winsorized the mean at the 
0.5% level in both tails of the distribution to reduce the outliers’ influence and to get 











As Figures 4A and 4B illustrate, the 5 year trend is two-fold: from year -5 to year -3 the 
performance of the firm declines while from years -3 to -1 it gradually increases for both 
the mean and the median ROA. The huge disparity between the mean and median 
values suggests that some firms perform really poorly prior to the bid while the majority 
of them have positive return on assets.  
For the 3 year trend from figure 5A and 5B, the results are consistent with the 5 year 
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Figure 4A. Mean 5Y ROA Trend 
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and median ROA are really different. The presence of some firms that perform very 




To put these numbers in perspective, the firms’ returns were adjusted with their 
respective industry. I first extracted the mean ROA for each year, for each SIC code7 , 
using all the firms in my database. I then adjusted the ROA of my sample firms by their 
                                                          
7


















Figure 5A. Mean 3Y ROA Trend
















respective industry (and therefore, SIC code). I finally computed the average and 
median for each year, both in my 3 year and 5 year trend samples. I also repeated the 
process using the industry median instead of the industry mean which gave me the ROA 
adjusted by industry median. Again, since some values were extreme, I winsorized 0.5% 
of the values in both tails of the distributions. All the results are reported in the 
following graphs for both the 3 year and 5 year periods.  
 
 
The values plotted in Figures 6A and 6B are average ROA adjusted by the industry mean. 
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Figure 6A. 5Y Mean ROA Adjusted by 
Industry Median
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Figure 6B. 5Y Mean ROA Adjusted by 
Industry Mean
5y Mean Adjusted Mean ROA 5y Mean Adjusted Wins Mean ROA
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industry median ROA on a given year. However, when performance is adjusted by the 
industry mean, future acquirer outperform their peers by a huge margin. Two 
explanations are possible. First, the firms that outperformed their respective industry 
did it in a most extreme way, pulling the mean ROA up. Second, it may be due to the 
fact that some industries had a really low number of observations which may have led 
to an extremely low average performance for a given SIC code: 25 industry-years have a 




These graphs do not completely reflect the sample firms since the sample mean tells 
only part of the story. Figure 6C gives a better understanding of firm performance prior 
to acquisition: the effect of firms with extreme performance is neutralized and the plot 
gives a better idea of the performance in the sample. When we consider the median of 
both the industry mean and median adjusted ROA, it becomes clear that the majority of 
acquirers-to-be outperform their industry prior to making a bid. All the above graphs 
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Figure 6C. 5y Adjusted Median ROA
Median of Mean adjusted ROA Median of Median Adjusted ROA
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When plotting the same values over the three year period, (figure 7A through 7C), the 
results are essentially the same, except that the sample size is much larger due to the 
extended availability of the data. Once again, firms underperform their industry when 
their ROA is adjusted with the industry median, while they outperform when adjusted 
by the industry mean. As was the case with the 5 years median graph, the majority of 
firms outperform their industry in 3 years leading to the first bid, with the same upward 















Figure 7A. 3y Mean ROA Adjusted by 
Industry Median












Figure 7B. 3y Mean ROA Adjusted by 
Industry Mean




From the results of this section, one can conclude that the majority of firms that are 
going to make a first bid show an increasing performance in the three years prior to the 
deal, and outperform other firms in their respective industry during that period. This is 
contrary to the view that firms make acquisitions to improve their performance. The 
underlying motivation for acquisition may be to maintain the high level of performance 
that the acquiring firm has pre-bid. The results shown here are consistent with Asquith 
et al. (1983), Roll (1986), Harford (2004) and Bradley & Sundaram (2004;2006) who also 
find that acquirers-to-be perform better than their competitors, and that firm 
performance may very well drive acquisitions. 
 
V.Methodology 
a. Sample Matrix 
The first step to testing the hypothesis is to organize the matched sample into a matrix 
of acquirers based on their growth and resources. Using the definition of growth and 
resources of Palepu (1982), growth is defined as the average sales growth of the past 2 
and 3 years, depending on data availability, since it is a good proxy for the company’s 
















Figure 7C. 3y  Adjusted Median ROA
Median of Mean Adjusted ROA Median of Median Adjusted ROA
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For the resource component of the firm, two things have to be considered: current 
liquidity and the potential to raise capital. Since a firm’s cash on hand and liquid 
investments are expected to have a direct impact on the firms’ acquisition decisions, it 
needs to be included in the resource component of a company. However, cash is an 
absolute value and doesn’t have the same relative importance depending on the size of 
the firm: a multi-billion firm with $10M on hand does poorly in terms of liquidity against 
a firm with a $100M market capitalization with the same cash position. For this reason, 
the ratio “Cash and Short-term Investments / Total Assets” is used to define liquidity. 
The leverage ratio (Debt / Equity) is used to measure the firms’ potential to raise capital. 
As leverage increases, the firm’s risk of default also increases, dragging the cost to raise 
debt with it. With a higher cost of debt, it becomes less appealing for a firm to raise 
capital using this method. Thus, a low value of leverage means a high potential to issue 
debt, while a higher value of leverage reduces that potential. 
For a firm’s growth and cash to be considered as “high”, it has to be above the median 
value of its respective industry for the current year while those under the median are 
classified as “low”. When leverage is higher than the industry median, the firm has a 
lower debt issuing potential and thus has lower resources. The opposite is true if 
leverage is smaller than the median. Thus, for a firm to be in the low-growth and high 
resource sample, it has to have lower sales growth, leverage, and higher liquidity than 
the respective industry median. Panel A. of Table 5 summarizes the 4 subsamples using 
these definitions of growth and resource. For firms making more than one acquisition in 
a year, only their first annual bid was kept. Firms that didn’t qualify in one of the 4 
above categories or lacked data availability for the computation of Growth or Resource 
are summarized in Panel B. of the table.  
The industry median was chosen arbitrarily as an objective measure of comparison 
between the firm and the industry. It has the drawback of clustering the firms with 
extreme values with those who are just a little better than the industry, but still acts as a 




Table 5. Growth-Resources Matrix 
The matrix in Panel A. classifies the firms according to their respective growth and resources. To be 
classified as high growth, a firm must have its average last 2 years sales variation greater than the 
industry median. To be in the high resource category, the firm must have higher cash and short term 
investment over total asset and lower leverage than the industry median. Panel B. reports the results 
for firms that were not classified in a growth-resources tier. Cash and stock deals consist of deals 
where the mode of payment was 100% cash or stocks and Mixed Deals are deals where both cash 
and stocks were used. 

















# Firm-Years 7087 
 
# Firm-Years 6492 
# Bids Next Year 480 (6.77%) 
 
# Bids Next Year 289 (4.45%) 
Cash Deals 71 (14.79%) 
 
Cash Deals 66 (22.84%) 
Stock Deals  198 (41.25%) 
 
Stock Deals  62 (21.45%) 
Mixed Deals 60 (12.5%) 
 
Mixed Deals 37 (12.8%) 
 




# Firm-Years 8147 
 
# Firm-Years 8217 
# Bids Next Year 659 (8.89%) 
 
# Bids Next Year 512 (6.23%) 
Cash Deals 176 (26.71%) 
 
Cash Deals 143 (27.93%) 
Stock Deals  147 (22.31%) 
 
Stock Deals  84 (16.4%) 
Mixed Deals 97 (14.72%) 
 
Mixed Deals 63 (12.3%) 
  
     
                   Panel B. Unclassified Firms 
  # Firm-Years 77749 
     # Bids Next Year 2446 (3.15%) 
     Cash Deals 447 (18.27%) 
    
 
Stock Deals 717 (29.31%)  
    
 
Mixed Deals 273 (11.16%) 
    
Firstly, when comparing the unclassified firms with those classified in the growth-
resources tiers, one can quickly see that firms in all four combinations of growth and 
resources have higher occurrences of making a bid. Cash deals are more prevalent in all 
but the high growth- high resources sample than for the unclassified firms while the 
opposite is true for stock deals.  
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Three observations stand out from the table: high-growth high-resource firms are the 
most frequent users of stock for acquisitions (over 41% of their acquisitions).  These 
firms are using their highly valued stocks to make an acquisition despite having a lot of 
cash. This is further confirmed when compared to the sample of firms that were not 
classified in any growth-resources tier. 
Second, firms in the “low-low” sample are almost as likely to make an acquisition as 
those in the high-high (6.23% vs 6.77%) and 28% of their deals are paid cash even 
though their resources are low. Last and most importantly, firms with low growth, high 
resources, which we expected to have the greatest incentives to make an acquisition to 
correct this imbalance, are less likely to make a bid in the next year. This finding is 
surprising, and a possible explanation is that these firms are acquired before they even 
have a chance to make a bid. This view is consistent with Jensen & Meckling’ (1983) 
argument that the market for corporate control acts as a disciplinary force: managers 
who accumulate a lot of idle cash would be taken over by a more efficient management 
team. 
To investigate this possibility, all deals where a firm was the target of a majority interest 
purchase or a merger were extracted from SDC, for the period of 1995 to 2005, and 
matched with the estimation sample of acquirers using the 8-digit CUSIP. From the 
initial sample of 7031 targets, 3038 deals were successfully matched. These successful 
matches were then divided in 4 subsamples using the same criterions as the acquirers. 
In Table 6 are shown the comparative matrixes for bidders and targets where the 
hypothesized and observed acquiring/acquired frequencies are reported. The 
probability to make an acquisition P(A) and become a target P(T) are reported for each 
quadrant. The definition of resources has been relaxed to increase the sample size8: only 
the variable cash and short term investments over total assets is considered as the use 
                                                          
8
 The matrixes using both leverage and short term liquidity as well as exclusively leverage for the 
definition of resource are available in the appendix. 
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TABLE 6. Growth-Resources Matrixes Comparing Expected 
and Actual Probability of M&A Activity 
The left matrix shows the hypothesized likelihood that a firm will make a bid or become a target in 
the next year based on its level of growth and resources. The right matrix displays the actual 
frequency for both targets and acquirers. To be classified as high growth, a firm must have its 
average last 2 year sales growth greater than the industry median and to be in the high resource 
category, it must have higher cash and short term investments over total assets than the industry 
median only. 
Hypothesized Likelihood of M&A 
Activity 
 





























 P(A):7.14% P(A):4.88% 
 













 P(A):7.16% P(A):4.45% 
 




Several interesting insights are evident from the above matrices: counter to what was 
expected, the growth-resource mismatch had little impact on the observed frequency of 
targets. The likelihood of becoming a target is qualitatively higher in the High/High 
quadrant and qualitatively lower in the Low/Low quadrant. In contrast, the frequency of 
acquisitions is much higher in the quadrants reflecting high growth. For the quadrant 
with high resources and low growth, the likelihood for a firm to become a target isn’t 
high as expected given their high resources, which still doesn’t explain why these firms 
aren’t making acquisitions. This suggests that managers of high resource / low growth 
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firms either aren’t actively seeking to acquire for the sake of acquiring or that these 
managers are entrenched and consequently are protected from the disciple of the 
market.  
 According to these matrixes, growth appears to be strongly associated with the 
frequency of acquisitions. More than 7% of firms in both high growth sub-samples 
became acquirers while less than 5% became acquirers in the low growth subsamples. 
This suggests that the growth-resource imbalance potentially holds: firms may try to 
make an acquisition of a resource-rich firm to fuel their own high growth, but are not 
necessarily willing to spend their resources on acquisitions for the purpose of increasing 
their low growth. There is little distinction made across the samples for potential targets 
as the proportion of firms being taken over doesn’t vary significantly. A test on two 
proportions confirmed the robustness of the differences between the four tiers with 
significance of 1%. 
 
VI.The Models 
The Growth-Resources Ratio 
In this section I test the relationship between the probability of acquisition and the 
growth-resources imbalance hypothesis in a multivariate setting. The growth-resource 
ratio is the primary variable of interest in explaining the probability of a firm becoming 
an acquirer. The variables used to proxy for growth are the average sales growth over 
the past two years (reflecting past firm growth), and cash and short term investments 
divided by total assets9. As a robustness check, the average growth period was also 
extended to 3 years.  Two alternate definitions of growth using the market-to-book ratio 
rather than past sales are also used and reported in the appendix. The use of this ratio 
differs from the sales growth since the market value reflects the investors’ evaluation of 
future growth opportunities. The first alternative is to use the average last two years 
                                                          
9
 (Avg 2yrs ∆ Sales) / (cash & short term Inv. / Total Assets) 
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change in the ratio to represent the average change in expected growth of the firm by 
investors. The average market-to-book ratio over the last two years is used as the 
second alternative definition to reflect the average expected growth of the firm. These 
variables are also computed for the three year period when data is available and can 
prove useful to determine if the market can anticipate the occurrence of an event long 
before it actually happens. 
The resources of a firm can also be proxied by many alternative definitions. Cash and 
short term investment relative to the book value of the firm is used to reflect the true 
value of cash relative to the firm10 to complement the cash over total assets resources 
proxy. Then, the free cash flows over total assets to measure the effect of an increase in 
cash reserves of a firm on the probability of making an acquisition is used. The results of 
these alternative definitions are also reported in the appendix. 
The squared growth-resource ratio is also included in the analysis to give us the 
expected parabolic shape of the probability to make an acquisition. It also ignores the 
effect of a firm’s negative growth on the dependant variable and influences the 
probability to make a bid based on the “absolute” value of the growth, and the ratio.  
The Control Variables 
The model also contains several control variables. Leverage acts as a proxy for a firm’s 
capital structure and ability to raise debt and is used as a control variable since it is not 
included in the growth-resource ratio. Merger is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
acquisition occurred  during a merger wave (1995-2000 ) and recession is a dummy 
variable having a  value of one if the year of the deal was declared a recession according 
to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Past growth is a variable that 
takes different definitions depending on the growth component of the growth-resource 
ratio. If, in the ratio, past sales growth is used, then the control variable Past Growth is 
                                                          
10
 Cash is an important component included of a firm’s total assets and using the book value of a firm 
avoids having the variable in both the numerator and the denominator of the resource component. 
Therefore, it reflects the “real” value of money compared to the firm’s used assets. 
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defined as the average past anticipated growth of a firm by the market proxied by the 
average past market-to-book ratio. If, on the other hand, the growth component of the 
ratio is proxied by either alternate definition using the market-to-book ratio, then the 
control variable Past Growth is proxied by the average past sales growth. These control 
variables are used to capture both the past expected growth and the actual past growth 
of a firm in the model.  Firm size is estimated using a firm’s total assets. Unlike most 
studies using OLS, this analysis uses the absolute value of a firm’s asset and not its 
natural logarithm. The reason is simple: the nature of the logit model equation uses the 
    component which differs with the regular OLS regression. The purpose behind 
logging the total asset values is to assess the impact of a percentage change in the 
control variable on the dependant variable. Thus, if we log total assets, then the 
component becomes          which is the equivalent of      , which reverts back to 
the absolute value of the variable. One can quickly see that logging the variable results 
in an automatic reverting to the original ‘’absolute’’ value which would create the same 
issues as using the un-logged values in an OLS regression. 
 All the variables used in the models are summarized in Table 7. The correlation matrix 











Table 7. Variables Used in the Logit Models 
Variables Description 
Compustat Item Id Used to 
Compute Variables 
      
Growth Variables     
2 Years Sales 
The average sales growth of a firm 2 years 
before y=0. 
SALECHG1 
3 Years Sales 
The average sales growth of a firm 3 years 
before y=0. 
SALECHG1 
2 Years ∆MTB 
The average change in market-to-book 
ratio for the past 2 years. 
(BKVLPS*CSHO)/MKVAL 
3 Years ∆MTB 
The average change in market-to-book 
ratio for the past 3 years. 
(BKVLPS*CSHO)/MKVAL 
2 Years MTB 
The average value of the market-to-book 
ratio for the past 2years. 
(BKVLPS*CSHO)/MKVAL 
3 Years MTB 
The average value of the market-to-book 
ratio for the past 3 years. 
(BKVLPS*CSHO)/MKVAL 
      
Resources Variables     
Cash/TotAss 
A firm's cash and short term investment 
over total assets. 
CHE / AT 
Cash/Bvfirm 
A firm's cash and short term investment 
over the book value of the firm. 
CHE / (BKVLPS*CSHO) 
FCF/TotAss 
A firm's total free cash flow over total 
assets. 
FREECFL / AT 
      
Control Variables     
Firm Size A firm's total assets AT 
Leverage A firm's total debts over total equity DT / CEQ 
Merger Wave 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
current year is included in a merger wave. 
- 
Recession 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 








Table 8. Correlation Matrix 
The growth-resources ratio (G/R) is computed as (average last 2 year sales change/ (Cash & short 
term investment / Total assets)). G/R^2 is the value of the growth resources ratio squared. Firm size 
is proxied by a firm's total asset, leverage by total debt / total equity and past growth represent the 
average last 2 years market-to-book ratio. 
Varivable G/R (G/R)^2 Firm Size Leverage Past Growth 
G/R 1 
    
(G/R)^2 0.9382 1 
   
Firm Size -0.0128 -0.0142 1 
  
Leverage 0.0243 0.0117 0.0519 1 
 




The Estimation Sample 
For the next sections, I use an estimation sample that covers the period 1995 to 2005. I 
keep a holdout sample from 2006 to 2008 to test the predictive ability of the model. 
Table 9 summarizes both samples, as well as the population from which they were taken 
(the population is the combination of the working and holdout samples). All the 
variables reported in this descriptive statistics table have been winsorized in both tails 
of the distribution (0.5% of observations in each tails) prior to forming the estimation 
and hold-out samples which explains why most variables have identical ranges through 
the samples. At first glance, the negative leverage may seem odd but these values are 
due to firms’ negative equity on their balance sheet. While this is counterintuitive, a 
firm with high leverage can sometimes be forced to write off some of its assets enough 
that they become smaller than its liabilities, thus creating negative equity. Another 
possible explanation for the negative values includes a massive share repurchase or 
dividend payment that would reduce the assets value and decrease the equity into 
negative territory. Last, a drop in equity can be due to firm that reports net losses over 
the years. Reasons for negative equity in the sample are not investigated in this study. 
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Firm Characteristics Obs Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
 
Obs Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
 
Obs Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
Total Assets ($M) 74262 1410.2 79.1 5657.1 0.0 58292.7   11302 2643.5 169.1 8320.8 0.0 58292.7   85564 1573.1 86.9 6090.5 0.0 58292.7 
Total Debt ($M) 73236 345.0 6.1 1375.9 0.0 13806.5   11082 572.5 9.2 1837.5 0.0 13806.5   84318 374.9 6.4 1447.1 0.0 13806.5 
ROA (%) 72802 -45.0 0.8 224.1 -2500.0 46.5   11016 -49.4 2.2 250.8 -2500.0 46.5   83818 -45.6 0.9 227.8 -2500.0 46.5 
ROE (%) 63721 -42.0 4.5 211.8 -2118.3 181.5   9821 -27.6 6.5 173.2 -2118.3 181.5   73542 -40.0 4.8 207.1 -2118.3 181.5 
BVFirm ($M) 71211 473.1 36.5 1590.6 -114.4 11908.6   10787 866.4 85.7 2288.4 -114.4 11908.6   81998 524.9 40.7 1704.0 -114.4 11908.6 
Debt/ Total Assets 
(%) 
72918 34.8 17.6 94.8 0.0 1089.4   11041 36.6 13.9 112.3 0.0 1089.4   83959 35.0 17.1 97.3 0.0 1089.4 
Leverage 73931 0.5 0.2 3.1 -18.5 24.3   11272 0.4 0.1 2.7 -18.5 24.3   85203 0.5 0.1 3.1 -18.5 24.3 
MTB Ratio 43707 2.8 1.8 10.6 -63.2 79.2   10096 2.8 2.1 8.9 -63.2 79.2   53803 2.8 1.8 10.3 -63.2 79.2 
                                          
Growth & Resources                                         
Average 2yrs sales 
growth (%) 
50311 44.8 10.4 182.4 -79.9 1919.8   13526 43.8 12.7 182.0 -79.9 1919.8   63837 44.6 11.0 182.3 -79.9 1919.8 
Average 3yrs sales 
growth (%) 
41102 40.5 10.7 154.6 -59.6 1657.8   12753 40.5 12.9 158.2 -59.6 1657.8   53855 40.5 11.3 155.4 -59.6 1657.8 
cash/totass 73745 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0   11246 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0   84991 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 
cash/bv 71211 0.3 0.2 0.8 -4.4 5.8   10787 0.4 0.2 0.8 -4.4 5.8   81998 0.3 0.2 0.8 -4.4 5.8 
fcf/totass 73745 -0.1 0.0 0.6 -6.2 0.4   11246 -0.2 0.0 0.8 -6.2 0.4   84991 -0.2 0.0 0.7 -6.2 0.4 
                                          
Growth-Resources Ratios                                       
2yrs/cashtotass 45056 1406.3 93.2 7261.3 -5958.0 79619.6   9115 1335.9 93.2 7508.3 -5958.0 79619.6   54171 1394.5 93.2 7303.4 -5958.0 79619.6 
2yrs/cashbv 43949 445.0 43.6 2837.1 
-
11323.2 
28580.4   8777 404.4 44.4 2766.1 
-
11323.2 




2yrs/fcftotass 39297 -86.0 18.4 3704.8 
-
29962.8 
23704.5   9046 -20.2 52.7 3168.2 
-
29962.8 




3yrs/cashtoas 36759 1332.5 94.8 6650.3 -4033.7 74088.6   8633 1325.0 99.3 7247.7 -4033.7 74088.6   45392 1331.1 95.8 6767.9 -4033.7 74088.6 
3yrs/cashbv 35853 376.0 42.8 2515.9 
-
11540.6 
25301.6   8308 380.9 45.9 2564.6 
-
11540.6 




3yrs/fcftotass 36051 -40.7 23.5 3383.1 
-
26449.6 
22877.5   8560 -25.2 56.4 2981.5 
-
26449.6 







This study deals with estimating the probability of the occurrence of certain events that 
have 2 or 3 different outcomes, depending of the context. It thus requires the use of 
logit models. The first models predict the probability that a firm will become an acquirer 
in the year Y+1 where Y is the current year. Since this event has only two categorical 
responses (acquires next year or does not acquire next year), a binary logit model is 
used. The same model is also used to test if the firm will become a target in the year 
Y+1.  
In the market for corporate control, a firm isn’t limited to a simple yes/no type of 
decision (like acquiring or not; be acquired or not): it has the freedom to make a choice 
between these mutually exclusive events: become acquirer, be taken over or do 
nothing. As the dependant variable isn’t binary but has multiple outcomes I use the 
multinomial logit model to complement the binary logit. However, the multinomial logit 
model relies on an important assumption: the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA). This means that adding or removing an alternative outcome should not alter the 
odds ratio between the other alternatives. In this case, let’s suppose that P(Acquire) is 
20% and P(Status Quo) is 80%: the odds ratio is 20/80 = ¼. Now if we add P(Target) with 
a probability of 20%, then P(Acquire) should become 16% and P(nothing) 64% so that 
the odds ratio remain constant (16/64 = ¼). However,  suppose that the manager of a 
cash-rich firm would prefer to make an acquisition in order to avoid being taken over, 
then P(Acquire) will increase relative to P(Status Quo) that will stay the same or (most 
likely) diminish as the manager fears for the continuity of his position. With P(Target) 
now a possibility, P(Acquire) is now 20% and P(Status Quo) is 60%. Now the odds ratio 
dropped to 1/3 (20/60).  
If such is the case, then the multinomial Logit model will necessarily make estimation 
errors on P(Acquire) and P(Target) and the results will be biased. To overcome this 
violation, it is possible to use a multinomial Probit model, which assumes that the 
outcomes are jointly normally distributed and can be correlated. These properties thus 
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relax the irrelevant alternative property of logit models.11 Computing such models used 
to be very challenging and thus they weren’t extensively used, but it has become 
increasingly feasible with the recent statistical packages. However, the maximum 
likelihood function usually used in this to estimate the parameters is still difficult as it 
involves integrating joint normal distributions.   Most statistical packages, including 
Stata (the one used in this study) use simulated likelihood techniques relying on random 
draws and MonteCarlo simulations. This is true even for the simplest of cases where 3 
outcomes are possible and the methodology gets increasingly complicated and time 
consuming as more outcomes are added.  
It is still unclear if multinomial logit performs better than the multinomial probit. For 
example Kopko (2007) finds that it performs better in predicting the vote-choice of an 
elector in the case of multiparty voting (with 3 or more outcomes) despite the violation 
of the IIA assumption.  
In this study, several problems occurred when estimating the multinomial probit model 
using the growth-resources ratio: the computing time was extreme and the logarithm of 
the likelihood didn’t converge. For that reason, the multinomial probit isn’t reviewed 
here and the few results that could be computed are included in the appendix to 







                                                          
11
 For an extensive coverage of the MNP, the reader can refer to McCulloch & Rossi (1994) as the model is 




a. Binary Logit 
The logistic function, in its probability form, is described as: 
        
   
     
    (1) 
Or P(y = 0) = 
 
       
   (2) 
 
Where x is a vector of independent variables and f(x) represents the probability of 
becoming a bidder in the year Y+1. The model can also be explained with its logit from 
as:  
   
       
        
=           (3) 
 
The vector X is defined as: 
       
      
         
      
      
         
 
 
              (4) 
where Xk is the set of control variables. Of course this binary logit models only applies 
when there are two possible outcomes or events for a given situation: the use of this 
model alone would make an incomplete study that doesn’t account all the possibilities 
of a firm. 
Results are presented in this section in two parts: first the binary logit models are 
exposed for both acquirer and targets where pPcquire) vs P(Status Quo) and P(Target) 
vs P(Status Quo) are considered to be two exclusive sets of outcomes. Then, I use a 2-
step binary logit model to determine if a firm will first be active in the takeover market 
and in the second step, if it will become an acquirer or a target given the fact that it will 
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become active.  The second part reviews the multinomial logit model that is applied to 
take into account the more realistic approach that  a firm has 3 choices in the market for 
corporate control (acquire, target or nothing) rather than only 2. 
 An important thing to consider is that only the results where a firm’s growth is defined 
as “average last 2-3 years sales change” are presented. The tables summarizing results 
where the growth is computed with the firm’s market-to-book ratio and change in 
market-to-book are presented in the appendix for robustness checks. Results with the 3 
different definitions of resources are presented for each of the growth variables to 
facilitate comparisons between the models. The difference is sample size for the 
different regressions is due to the availability of the data for the different components 
















Table 10. Binary Logit Model Using the Growth-Resources Ratio 
This table summarizes the coefficients of the independent variables on the probability to become an 
acquirer (panel A.) and a target (panel B.) A description of the growth and resources components of the 
ratio is provided for each regression in the first two rows. The variable Past Growth is expressed as the 
average last 2 years (3 years) market to book ratio, which represents the average past anticipated growth 
of the firm by the market. 
Panel A. Acquirers 
Growth 
Description 








Value of Firm 
Cash/Book 
Value of Firm 
Free Cash 





G/R 0.000019 0.0000183 0.0001432 0.0001205 0.0000107 0.0000337 
  (0.123) (0.246) (0)*** (0)*** (0.114) (0)*** 
G/R^2 -4.91E-10 -5.10E-10 -8.22E-09 -6.24E-09 8.27E-12 -2.32E-10 
  (0.029)** (0.086)* (0)*** (0.001)*** (0.643) (0.606) 
Firm Size 0.0000535 0.0000479 0.0000532 0.0000477 0.0000537 0.000048 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth 0.0273398 0.0237332 0.0279723 0.0246159 0.0274624 0.0238193 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Leverage -0.0049798 -0.009141 -0.0077478 -0.120013 -0.0057181 -0.0102716 
  (0.587) (0.386) (0.411) (0.271) (0.536) (0.337) 
Merger Wave 0.1767491 1.752016 0.1517971 1.710129 0.1987219 1.787759 
  (0.005)*** (0)*** (0.017)** (0)*** (0.002)*** (0)*** 
Recession -0.1982395 -0.2241861 -0.2042722 -0.2301953 -0.1922233 -0.2263112 
  (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.01)*** (0.004)*** 
Intercept -2.750024 -2.68146 -2.751035 -2.684645 -2.751972 -2.681531 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 21509 16162 21230 15932 21277 16023 





Panel B. Targets 
Growth 
Description 








Value of Firm 
Cash/Book 
Value of Firm 
Free Cash 





G/R 0.0000336 3.83E-06 0.0001368 0.0000743 -1.35E-05 -0.0000179 
  (0.224) (0.912) (0.097)* (0.251) (0.443) (0.469) 
G/R^2 -8.06E-10 -5.26E-11 -1.60E-08 -3.81E-09 -1.07E-10 -5.31E-10 
  (0.189) (0.923) (0.109) (0.279) (0.637) (0.649) 
Firm Size -0.0000138 -0.0000149 -0.0000144 -0.000015 -0.0000117 -0.0000139 
  (0.24) (0.239) (0.221) (0.237) (0.309) (0.266) 
Past Growth 0.0102447 0.0136028 0.104428 0.0145473 0.0108276 0.0139703 
  (0.132) (0.119) (0.134) (0.101) (0.114) (0.11) 
Leverage 0.0068924 0.01638 0.0058609 0.016002 0.0101451 0.0190978 
  (0.73) (0.464) (0.776) (0.491) (0.614) (0.395) 
Merger Wave 0.0078227 0.7217154 0.0149843 0.7054269 -0.0309154 0.7512796 
  (0.959) (0.037) (0.921) (0.041)** (0.843) (0.03)** 
Recession -0.085014 -0.1664481 -0.0521469 -0.1397156 -0.0624099 -0.1270732 
  (0.599) (0.346) (0.747) (0.429) (0.702) (0.471) 
Intercept -4.306088 -4.326525 -4.300962 -4.340157 -4.323016 -4.344835 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 21509 16162 21230 15932 21277 16023 
*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 10 presents the results for the binary logit model. For these preliminary results, 
the important variables are the growth resources ratios. From panel A. that reports 
coefficients for future acquirers, half the cases are insignificant. Overlooking the 
significance, it is always positively related to the probability of a firm to make an 
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acquisition. Firm size is also positively related to making an acquisition, which makes 
sense since their size makes it easier for them to “digest” the big financial acquisition 
that are mergers and acquisitions when compared to smaller firms. The variable growth, 
representing the average past anticipated growth by the market is also positively 
related to the probability of an acquisition. This relationship is consistent with the view 
that firms tend to have better performance pre-acquisition assuming that it is 
anticipated by the market prior to the bid. If the growth component of the ratio is 
calculated on a 3 year period, the effect of the merger wave control variable increases 
dramatically on the dependent variable.12 A possible explanation for this result is that 
observations that use a 3-year period were computed from 1998 and onwards, whereas 
observations using a 2-year period started from 1997. Because the merger wave lasted 
from 1995 to 2000 and the sample ranges from 1995 to 2005, it is possible that the 
Merger Wave effect on the probability of acquisition increased a lot for the 3-year 
period due to the much smaller amount of observations that were included in a merger 
wave. Nonetheless, this result is still puzzling. 
In contrast, Panel B of Table 10 shows the results for the same models but using the 
probability of becoming a target as the dependant variable. Not surprisingly, the vast 
majority of the results lack statistical significance. It is interesting to see the impact of 
different definitions of the resource component of the growth-resources ratio: ignoring 
the statistical insignificance, when it is measured as cash, the impact on the probability 
of becoming a target is positive while it is negative when using free cash flows. This 
would suggest that a short-term rise in a firm’s liquidity is an important criterion for a 
firm to become a target. Also, firm size is negatively correlated with being a target, 
which is consistent with the generally accepted view that size acts as a deterrent to 
takeover activity. 
As an alternative approach, I divided the sample into 4 subsamples classified as high or 
low growth and resources and then estimated the probability models within each 
                                                          
12
 Running the same regressions without the Merger Wave variable didn’t yield differences in the results: 
same sign of coefficients and no difference in statistical significance. 
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subsample. To be considered on the high resources side, a firm must have higher cash 
over total assets and lower leverage than the industry median. The opposite 
combination applies for the low resources category. To be considered as a high (low) 
growth firm, the average past 2 years sales growth has to be higher (lower) than the 
industry median.  These subsamples represent each tiers of the aforementioned 
growth-resource matrix and allow further testing of the growth-resource imbalance on 
the probability of acquisition. More precisely, this alternative approach can shed light on 
the relative importance of the growth-resource ratio for both subsamples where there is 
an imbalance and see how it contrasts with those who don’t. Firms that did not fit into 
either of these subsamples were not included in these models. 
 Table 11 reports the results for each subsample. The growth variable used in the 
growth-resources ratio is the past average MTB ratio to avoid a bias in the results since 
the coefficient of the ratio would most likely be affected by the way each subsamples 
were divided if the growth definition was kept as the average sales change. The variable 
past growth is still included in the model so that the regression is consistent with the 
ones mentioned above: because the growth component of the ratio is computed with 
the average MTB change, the control variable “past growth” is the average past sales 












TABLE 11. Binary Logit Model Using the Split Subsamples 
This table summarizes the results of the binary logit model estimated for the following 4 subsamples: high growth-
high resources, high-growth-low resources, low growth-high resources and low growth-low resources. To be included 
in the high growth tiers, a firm must have a higher past average 2 years sales growth than the industry median 
whereas to be included in the high resource tier, it has to have higher cash over totals assets and lower leverage than 
the industry median. The opposite is also true for the low growth and low resources tiers. The description of the 
growth component of the ratio is given in the table for each regression. The resources component is "Cash & Short-
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Average 






2y MTB  
Average 





G/R 0.025326 0.011039 0.000519 -5.94E-05 0.00024 0.000597 -0.000424 -0.00128 
  (0)*** (0.012)** (0.073)* (0.859) (0.89) (0.831) (0.244) (0.007)*** 
G/R^2 -9.91E-05 -2.49E-05 -2.06E-07 1.11E-08 6.62E-07 1.01E-06 9.16E-08 3.06E-07 
  (0.002)*** (0.265) (0.053)** (0.919) (0.821) (0.863) (0.388) (0.044)*** 
Firm Size 6.66E-05 6.04E-05 5.44E-05 4.42E-05 5.31E-05 2.84E-05 5.71E-05 5.66E-05 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0.02)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth 0.000228 -5.32E-05 0.000298 -1.84E-05 0.000214 -0.000154 -0.000103 0.000895 
  (0.561) (0.918) (0.524) (0.98) (0.747) (0.912) (0.929) (0.553) 
Leverage 0.082378 0.063254 -0.066296 -0.02938 0.233954 0.207171 -0.051851 -0.077598 
  (0.243) (0.348) (0.027)** (0.302) (0.121) (0.239) (0.088)* (0.046)** 
Merger Wave 0.09244 1.499423 0.095141 1.442957 -0.287417 2.25758 0.224097 1.687729 
  (0.582) (0)*** (0.487) (0)*** (0.188) (0)*** (0.163) (0)*** 
Recession Year -0.445876 -0.44549 -0.091818 -0.187377 -0.429453 -0.44856 -0.07429 -0.061259 
  (0.027)** (0.035)** (0.563) (0.244) (0.074)* (0.093)* (0.679) (0.742) 
Intercept -2.937069 -2.640864 -2.381884 -2.262991 -2.828245 -2.900479 -2.729022 -2.609209 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 3106 2295 3517 2560 2865 2049 3458 2619 




In the high-high sample, the results are consistent with those reported thus far13: 
positive and significant relationship between the growth-resources ratio and the 
probability to make an acquisition and negative coefficient of the ratio squared. The 
growth-resource ratio loses its statistical significance in the “unbalanced” samples which 
may be due to the use of the average change in market-to-book ratio as the growth 
variable instead of the average past sales growth, commonly used by similar models in 
the mergers and acquisitions literature. Results of the robustness check using alternate 
definitions of Resource (reported in the appendix) are consistent for every model: the 
growth-resource ratio in the high-high sample is significant and positive while it loses its 
significance in the other subsamples.  
Instead of using ratios, Table 12 shows the same model using dummy variables of 
interest in identifying if a firm has a growth-resource imbalance for the whole 
estimation sample. High growth firms have a higher average past sales growth than the 
industry median and thus a value of “1”. For resources, higher cash and short term 
investments over total assets than industry median has the value “1” while lower 
leverage than the industry has the value “1” since more capital is accessible. Therefore, 
for a firm to have high growth and high resources, for example, the dummy variables 
are equal to 1 for high growth and high cash, and 1 for low leverage. This model has the 
advantage of capturing the coefficient of every single combination of growth and 
resources and not excluding firms from the study: firms with high (low) levels of cash 
and leverage that were previously excluded since they didn’t fit the definition of high 
(low) resources are now taken into account with the dummy variables.  
Most of the coefficients are significant at the 1% level: as expected, firms with higher 
growth have a higher probability to make an acquisition in the next year, when growth 
is measured on both a 2 and 3 years basis. Higher cash than the industry also means a 
                                                          
13
As a robustness check, the binary logit model is also estimated using alternate resource definitions. The 
results are summarized in Table A.4 in the appendix.  
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higher probability to acquire, which is consistent with my previous expectations. The 
coefficient of Merger Wave is still dramatically higher when using the average growth 
over a 3 year period. 
Table 12. Binary Logit Model With Dummy Variables 
This table summarizes the results from the binary logit model using dummy variables to 
categorize growth and resources. The first column reports the results where growth is 
measured as the average 2 years sales change and the second column where it is  the 
average 3 years sales change. The dummy variable “high growth” takes a value of 1 if a 
firm’s growth, measured as the average 2 year sales change is greater than the industry 
median. The dummy variable “high cash” takes a value of 1 if the resource proxy, 
measured as cash and short term investments over total assets, is greater than the 
industry median. The dummy variable “leverage” takes a value of 1 if the firm's leverage 
is lower than the industry median. Past Growth is the average MTB for the past period 
identified for each column. 
Variable 2 Years 3 Years 
High Growth 0.4556924 0.3998823 
  (0)*** (0)*** 
High Cash 0.108417 0.0908063 
  (0.05)** (-0.15) 
Low Leverage -0.3185705 -0.2966225 
  (0)*** (0)*** 
FirmSize 0.0000533 0.0000483 
  (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth 0.0254265 0.0215055 
  (0)*** (0)*** 
Merger Wave 0.1937141 1.709476 
  (0.002)*** (0)*** 
Recession -0.1923725 -0.2249061 
  (0.01)*** (0.004)*** 
Intercept -2.932782 -2.829772 
  (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 21877 16400 




The results become interesting when we include leverage in the combination of growth 
and resources rather than cash only. With its negative coefficient, it undermines the 
argument of a firm becoming an acquirer when it has high resources since it has a 
greater impact on the dependant variable than the dummy Cash has. This would mean 
that, according to these results, high resource firms are not as likely to make an 
acquisition as previously thought14. Firms that are the most likely through the less likely 
to become an acquirer are, in order, firms with high growth, low resources; high growth, 
high resources; low growth, low resources; and low growth, high resources. These 
results are consistent with those reported in the 4-quadrants matrix (Table 5). 
The impact of leverage is contradictory to my initial prediction: having lower leverage 
means having relative easiness to obtain financing to do an acquisition but, according to 
the results, a firm that has lower leverage than its respective industry is less likely to 
make an acquisition. This result is puzzling and an intuitive explanation is that low 
leverage helps to finance internal growth organically, which may cause an acquisition 
with the purpose of acquiring resources less necessary. Also, those firms may tend to 
become targets given their relatively easy access to capital thereby preventing them 
from making an acquisition themselves. As for the average past anticipated growth, its 
positive coefficient strengthens the argument that growth is related to acquisition. 
Thus far, only the models based on pairs of outcomes were explained and it was 
assumed that the third alternative was not relevant. Pushing this idea further, I ran a 2 
step logistic regression to take into account of the third outcome: the first step, is to 
estimate the likelihood that the firm will become active in the takeover market or keep 
the status quo while the second step is to determine if a “takeover market active” firm 
is more likely to become an acquirer or a target. Panel A. of Table 13 summarizes the 
probability of a firm to become active in the takeover market and Panel B. summarizes 
                                                          
14
 This holds, of course, assuming that the definition of high resources suggested by Palepu (1982) of high 
cash and low leverage is correct. 
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the probability of a firm to become an acquirer given that the firm is active 
(P(Acquire|Active). 
Table 13. 2-Step Binary Logit Model 
Panel A. Probability of a Firm to Become Active 
 The growth and resources variables in the ratio are identified in the first 2 rows of the table. The variable Past 
Growth represents the average Market-to-Book ratio for the period identified in each column of the first row. 







Value of Firm 
Cash/Book 







G/R 0.0000216 0.0000154 0.0001384 0.0001143 0.0000436 0.0001098 
  (0.058)* (0.288) (0)*** (0)*** (0.133) (0.018)** 
G/R^2 -5.39E-10 -4.07E-10 -8.43E-09 -5.87E-09 1.10E-06 0.000012 
  (0.011)** (0.114) (0)*** (0)*** (0.88) (0.273) 
Firm Size 0.0000497 0.0000445 0.0000494 0.0000442 0.0000497 0.0000443 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth  0.0248715 0.0227413 0.0254437 0.0236818 0.0249723 0.0229925 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Leverage -0.0028453 -0.0052413 -0.0053528 -0.0079002 -0.0035469 -0.0064171 
  (0.738) (0.592) (0.541) (0.436) (0.68) (0.518) 
Merger Wave 0.1504823 1.728786 0.1307206 1.690154 0.1643762 1.748199 
  (0.012)** (0)*** (0.029)** (0)*** (0.006)*** (0)*** 
Recession -0.1736612 -0.2121072 -0.1729398 -0.2129785 -0.1665245 -0.2065646 
  (0.011)** (0.003)*** (0.012)** (0.003) (0.016)** (0.004) 
Intercept -2.553287 -2.499933 -2.55311 -2.50499 -2.544426 -2.491259 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 21509 16162 21230 15932 21039 15846 




Panel B. Probability of a Firm to Become an Acquirer Given That It Will Become Active 







Value of Firm 
Cash/Book 







G/R -0.0000105 0.0000214 0.0001243 0.0001014 0.000018 0.0000588 
  (0.752) (0.602) (0.243) (0.384) (0.382) (0.059) 
G/R^2 2.09E-10 -5.51E-10 -2.81E-09 -4.74E-09 1.12E-09 1.54E-09 
  (0.712) (0.41) (0.615) (0.394) (0.202) (0.322) 
Firm Size 0.0001074 0.000081 0.000107 0.0000801 0.0001038 0.0000801 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth  0.0281392 0.009095 0.027603 0.0083921 0.0267779 0.0072591 
  (0.007)*** (0.453) (0.008)*** (0.488) (0.011)** (0.552) 
Leverage -0.0179664 -0.0271282 -0.0197205 -0.0271165 -0.0217723 -0.0289877 
  (0.488) (0.338) (0.449) (0.341) (0.398) (0.298) 
Merger 
Wave 
-0.0463796 0.363874 -0.1001718 0.3321792 -0.0021689 0.3640022 
  (0.792) (0.311) (0.57) (0.357) (0.99) (0.31) 
Recession -0.2070487 -0.1470938 -0.2716912 -0.1907827 -0.2462343 -0.1987319 
  (0.253) (0.455) (0.134) (0.333) (0.177) (0.311) 
Intercept 1.485375 1.60867 1.474663 1.615501 1.493812 1.625549 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 1945 1555 1933 1544 1919 1541 
*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results from panel A. are very similar to those reported in Table 10 when becoming 
an acquirer or maintaining the status quo are the only options. This may be due to the 
greater proportion of acquirers than targets in the sample or that the conclusions drawn 
earlier about acquirers also apply to targets.  As for the second step, the model fails to 
find any significance in the growth-resource ratio. Only Firm Size is still significant and 
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positively related to a firm becoming an acquirer given that it will be active. So far, the 
models have been shown to be significant in predicting acquirers only.  
When the third outcome, being a target, is added in the analysis, the model is unable to 
distinguish between firms that become targets from those that become acquirers. This 
result is not completely surprising and requires further testing using models designed to 
test multiple outcomes. 
 
b. Multinomial Logit and Probit 
As discussed earlier, the multinomial logit models are similar to binary logit but they 
account for more than 2 possible outcomes of the dependent variable. In this case there 
are three different scenarios that can describe the dependent variable:  P(Status Quo) is 
the base outcome where it is equal to 0 and the firm maintains the status quo, 
P(Acquire) is equal to 1 and P(Target), 2. The multinomial logit equation is:  
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From which Yi is defined as an outcome and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables for 
that outcome. The multinomial and binary logit have very similar equations and 
computation, but the multinomial explains unordered and discreet polytomous 
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If J=2, then the equation simplifies to the binary logit equation (3). Replacing j and J, we 
get the probability functions for both the probability that a firm will be an acquirer and a 
target: 
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where  βAcq and βTar are the coefficients for the different vector of independent 
variables explaining the likelihood of a firm becoming either an acquirer or a target  
conditional on being active in the takeover market. The parameters β are the 
coefficients estimates of interest estimated by maximum likelihood. Just like the binary 
logit model, the estimated values of the multinomial logit are not absolute probability 
values but rather the logarithm of the odds ratio of event j relative to the base outcome, 
the status quo. 
Table 14 presents the results from the multinomial logit15 for the 2 outcomes of interest 
using the dummy variables representing high growth and high resources. For predicting 
both acquirers and targets, the coefficients are similar and of the same sign, but they 
have a significantly greater influence on the dependent variable for bidders. These 
results are very similar to those presented using the binary logit model: firms with 
higher growth, cash and leverage than the industry median are more likely to make a 
bid while those with low growth, low cash and low leverage are the less likely. 
Qualitatively similar conclusions can be drawn for targets.  
                                                          
15
 A complementary table reporting results from the multinomial Probit model using the dummy variables 
is available in the appendix if the reader wishes to compare results of both models. However, the 
multinomial Probit is not reviewed here due to the convergence issues: while the computer found a 
solution to the model using dummy variables, it ran calculations for several hours without finding results 
when using the growth-resource ratio, preventing this study to benefit from the input of such a model. 
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 The coefficients of leverage are always significant at the 1% level and negative. Firms 
with higher leverage than their peers are more likely to become either a target or a 
bidder. The relationship is stronger for targets, which suggests that firms with high 
leverage or potential financial difficulties are more likely to become targets. This makes 
sense, since a firm in trouble with too many debts resulting from poor managerial 



















Table 14. Multinomial Logit Model With Dummy Variables 
This table summarizes the results from the multinomial logit model using dummy variables to 
categorize growth and resources.  The first column reports the results for acquirers where growth is 
measured as average 2 years sales change and the second column reports the results for targets. The 
dummy variable “high growth” takes a value of 1 if a firm’s growth, measured as the average 2 year 
sales change is greater than the industry median. The dummy variable “high cash” takes a value of 1 
if the resource proxy, measured as cash and short term investments over total assets, is greater than 
the industry median. The dummy variable “leverage” takes a value of 1 if the firm's leverage is lower 




High Growth 0.4501954   0.1725072 
  (0)***   (0.153) 
 High Cash 0.093586   0.0272758 
  (0.094)*   (0.83) 
Low Leverage -0.313069   -0.5535483 
  (0)***   (0)*** 
Firm Size 0.0000534   -0.0000145 
  (0)***   (0.316) 
Past Growth  0.0248566   0.0127377 
  (0)***   (0.075)* 
Merger Wave 0.1770498   0.0886396 
  (0.005)   (0.556) 
Recession -0.1886495   -0.0681559 
  (0.011)**   (0.676) 
Intercept -2.911022   -4.166654 
  (0)***   (0)*** 
N= 21877   21877 
  # of Acquirers = 1661   # of Targets = 291 
*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The following table summaizes the results using the growth-resources ratio instead of 
the dummy variables. The growth variables measured by the average MTB ratio and 
change in MTB ratio were not included in the multinomial regressions because of their 
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insignificance in the binary logit models. The probit estimations were run but the results 
are not presented because the likelihood function didn’t- converge and there was no 
output generated by the statistical software used. Therefore, only the multinomial logit 
is included. 16 
 
Table 15. Multinomial Logit Model Using the Growth-Resources 
Ratio 
This table summarizes the results of the multinomial logit model. The growth component of the growth-
resources ratio is identified in the first row and the resource component is measured by cash / book value of 
the firm.  The variable Past Growth is defined as the average market-to-book ratio for the period identified for 
each column by the growth variable. 
Growth 2 Years Sales  2 Years Sales  3 Years Sales  3 Years Sales  
Resources 
Cash / Book Value 
of Firm 
Cash / Book Value 
of Firm 
Cash / Book Value 
of Firm 
Cash / Book Value 
of Firm 
Variable Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
G/R 0.0001364 0.0001971 0.0001209 0.0000832 
  (0)*** (0.031)** (0)*** (0.214) 
G/R ^2 -7.89E-09 -1.99E-08 -6.25E-09 -4.12E-09 
  (0)*** (0.077)* (0.001)*** (0.253) 
Firm Size 0.0000533 -0.0000105 0.0000476 -0.0000053 
  (0)*** (0.447) (0)*** (0.699) 
Past Growth 0.0273203 0.013375 0.0249778 0.015314 
  (0)*** (0.065)* (0)*** (0.106) 
Leverage -0.0071251 0.0048559 -0.0118044 0.0150933 
  (0.451) (0.817) (0.28) (0.527) 
Merger 
Wave 
0.1368542 0.0910808 1.746563 1.206615 
  (0.033)** (0.549) (0)*** (0)*** 
Recession -0.1989199 -0.0401628 -0.2294642 -0.1219492 
  (0.008)*** (0.807) (0.003)*** (0.497) 
Intercept -2.737124 -4.297553 -2.674381 -4.333386 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N 21230 21230 15932 15932 
  # Acquirers = 1666 # Targets = 287 # Acquirers = 1344 # Targets = 212 
*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                                          
16
 The table included for the discussion uses the ratio of average  sales growth / (cash/book value of firm) 
because it yielded extremely significant results compared to the other two definitions and it is the one 
used to predict future acquirers in the holdout sample. The other tables using alternate definitions of the 




Results from table 15 are essentially the same as those in the binary logit model for both 
the 2 and 3 years average growth period: as the growth-resources ratio, firm size and 
average past anticipated growth increase, so does the probability of acquiring. The 
coefficient of the squared ratio is still negative and leverage is insignificant for each 
regression.  A recession obviously decreases the probability of either acquiring or being 
acquired. Once again, we see the dramatic and puzzling increase in the effect of the 
variable Merger Wave is present when using a 3 year rather than 2 year period for the 
growth component in the growth-resources ratio. As for the targets, most results lack 
statistical significance. Using 2-year growth, the relationship of the ratio and the ratio 
squared are of the same sign and relatively similar. However, this result is isolated, given 
that all previous effects of the ratio on the probability to become a target aren’t 
significantly different than 0. 
 
Discussion and Comparison 
The Growth-Resource Ratio 
The study of the growth-resource imbalance when defined as a ratio has been found to 
significantly affect the probability of becoming an acquirer but not a target. More 
specifically, when the ratio is measured as the average sales growth over the relative 
cash and short term investments to the size of the firm, it has a positive impact on the 
probability of becoming an acquirer. This means that a relative increase in growth (the 
numerator of the ratio) always lead to an increase in the probability of acquisition. 
Measuring the influence on the dependent variable of the firms’ resources, in the 
denominator, is ambiguous: if the firms’ growth is negative, making the ratio negative, 
then an increase in resources will increase the probability to make an acquisition. If 
however, growth is positive, the same increase in resources will now negatively affect 
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that probability. For this reason, it is necessary to isolate both components of the ratio 
to shed light on their true impact. 
 When high growth and high resources are used as dummy variables, they are both 
found to positively affect the probability to make a bid in the coming year. However, the 
impact of high growth is more important than high cash, which strengthens the 
argument discussed regarding the growth-resources ratio and the fact that growth, 
rather than resources, seem to be driving acquisition decisions. 
 
 
The Growth-Resource Ratio Squared 
Another variable of interest to review is the growth-resource ratio squared. In every 
case but one, when the coefficient is significant, the sign is negative.  While the 
coefficients are low in absolute value, the impact on the distribution of probabilities of 
acquisition cannot be neglected. Figure 8A. plots the distribution of the estimated 
probabilities using the multinomial logit model where the coefficients were the most 
significant17. The graph illustrates the parabolic shape obtained when the ratio squared 
is included in the models. In contrast, Figure 8B. plots the same distribution without the 
squared ratio. The probability values were computed with the multinomial logit18 model 
using the definition of growth as the average past 2 year sales growth and the definition 
of resources as cash and short term investments over book value of the firm as both 
component of the growth-resource ratio19. The average values of each control variable 
were used to isolate the effects of the ratio on the probability of acquisition. It is 
                                                          
17
 The model that uses 2 years past sales growth over cash and short term investments relative to the 
book value of the firm as the definition of the ratio was the most significant and is the one used here. 
18
 The same figures using the binary logit model are available in the appendix. 
19
 The equation used to compute the probabilities is:         
       
 
    
          
 
       
   
, which is the 
multinomial logit equation. 
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important to note that the figures are both probability density functions and not 





Holding everything else constant, the influence of the squared-ratio is dramatic. In the 
model excluding the squared ratio we see that the impact of increasing the ratio reaches 
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ratio model we see that the impact of increasing the growth resource ratio increases 
until the ratio reaches approximately 10,000 and thereafter the impact decreases. The 
squared ratio model allows the investigation of the impact of the growth resource ratio 
to see if it exhibits a symmetrical pattern more reminiscent of a normal distribution than 
of the logistic distribution. 
Results of the Hypothesis Tests 
The evidence in this paper suggests that the growth-resources imbalance hypothesis 
holds partially for acquirers when the restrictive (Palepu; 1986, Ambrose et al.; 1992, 
Powell; 1997; 2004) definition of resources is used (high cash level and low leverage). 
Referring back to Table 12 and Table 14 that use the dummy variables to determine a 
firm’s growth and resource levels, results suggest that High Growth is the variable that 
has the most positive and significant impact on the probability to become an acquirer. 
On the other hand, High Resources has a significant negative effect on the dependent 
variable. Thus, firms with high growth and low resources (low cash level and high 
leverage) relative to the industry median have the highest chance of making an 
acquisition, and they don’t exhibit any preference between paying cash or stock (Table 
5). These results are consistent with my hypothesis that managers want to correct the 
imbalance for the good of the firm and the shareholders. Firms with low growth and 
high resources are the less likely to become an acquirer. This finding is very interesting 
as it contradicts my hypothesis and is consistent with the theory of agency:  managers 
prefer to keep the firms’ high cash level rather than spending it on an acquisition which 
would improve the firm’s growth potential and reduce the imbalance. This also means 
that the managers keep the firm’s leverage low and don’t exploit the available internal 
financing optimally: capital could be raised through debt to feed extra growth for the 
firm. Furthermore, they don’t exhibit any preference for stocks or cash as the method of 
payment. 
Firms having both high growth and high resources are the second most likely to make an 
acquisition. This is contrary to what I expected since these firms are assumed to be 
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“balanced’’: internal funding can fuel the high growth without the need of drastic 
measures. However, they are very likely to acquire and have much higher propensity to 
finance their acquisition with stocks (41.25% of the deals) rather than cash (14.79% of 
deals). This further confirms the agency theory for firms in the high resources tier and is 
consistent with the market timing theory. First, managers prevent the cash flows from 
being invested in a project in order to keep them for their own benefit. At the same 
time, they strengthen their relative importance to the firm by making an acquisition 
using most likely (because of the high growth) overvalued stocks. 
The firms with low growth and resources are second less likely to make an acquisition 
but almost as likely as firms in the high-high category. They have a preference for cash 
(27.93% of cases) rather than stocks (12.3%) that is most likely due to a probable low 
stock valuation. While they don’t technically show an “imbalance”, firms in the low-low 
category are those who perform the worst and the fact that they make an acquisition 
can be interpreted as either a genuine attempt by managers to improve the firm’s 
condition or, conversely, as a way to increase the firm’s dependence on them and to 
secure their job. The motives are unclear and thus are difficult to interpret.  
If we relax the restrictive definition of Resources used in the literature for takeover 
target models, we are able to predict the most likely future acquirers, using the models 
of Table 12 and 14. Large firms (high total assets) with high growth, high cash position 
and high leverage during a merger wave year (and not a recession year) are the ones 
with the highest probability of acquisition. These results make sense, as these firms 
have exhausted their internal funding but still need to fuel their high growth. The 
positive coefficient of high Cash is consistent with Harford (1999) and the generally 
accepted view that high cash levels lead to acquisition. However, its impact is lesser 
than Growth, which is contrary to the evidence of Harford (1999). Inversely, smaller 





VIII. Prediction Ability of the Models 
This section explores the actual ability of the different models to effectively predict 
which firms will become an acquirer in the next year. The models presented here are 
those who yielded the most significant results in the estimation section of the paper: 
two binary logit and two multinomial logit models were selected. For each type of 
model, two versions were used: one using the dummy variable definitions of high/low 
growth and resources and one using the continuous definition and the growth / 
resource ratio.20The fifth model, the 2-step binary logit model, although statistically 
insignificant for the most part in the second step, was kept for comparison purposes 
with the multinomial logit models. 
To successfully assess a model’s performance, it is necessary to find a probability cut-off 
that is reasonable. This cut-off is the percentage value used to determine if a firm is 
classified as an acquirer or not by the model. For example, choosing a cut-off of 10%, all 
firms with a predicted probability of becoming an acquirer higher than 10% will be 
classified as future acquirers while those with a lower probability than 10% will be 
classified as non acquirers. Of course, the models are not perfect and there are two 
types of errors that they can make. Type 1 error consists of misclassifying a firm that will 
become an acquirer as a firm who will not; while a type 2 error would put a non-
acquiring firm in the acquirers-to-be category. Table 16 shows the representation of 
these errors in a simple matrix.  
Table 16. Errors Matrix 
   Selection Criterion Did Acq Didn't Acq 
P(Acquire) > Cutoff 
(Classifed as Acquiror) 








                                                          
20
  The ratio is measured as (average last 2 years ∆ sales)/ (cash and short term investment / book value of 
the firm) for both models. 
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The choice of a good cut-off for the estimated models’ probability is challenging because 
it depends on the level and type of misclassification that can be admitted. There is a 
direct relationship between the importance of type 1 and type 2 errors and the cut-off 
used in the estimated probabilities of the models. By choosing a very high cut-off 
probability, the model will classify a low proportion of firms as future acquirers but will 
inevitably omit a lot of them in the process. This would lead to low type 2 errors and 
high type 1 errors.  
On the other hand, if the cut-off is too low, the model will identify a lot of firms as 
future acquirers. Of these, many will not become acquirers and the model will have high 
type 2 errors and low type 1 errors. The optimal cut-off to choose comes down to the 
perceived cost of both type of errors and minimizing the one we find the more costly. 
Empirically, using target-prediction models, different rules were applied: Palepu’s (1986) 
classification rule, predicting target firms, attributed the same weights (and costs) to 
type 1 and type 2 errors in his model. He sought to minimize type 1 errors so that most 
future target firms were correctly classified using a low cut-off probability. Thus, in a 
portfolio created of all the predicted future targets, the positive abnormal returns 
generated by the real targets were  nullified by the “normal” returns of all the other 
incorrectly classified firms (in his portfolio, 24 out of 625 firms are correctly classified as 
targets). Powell (2004) points that the cost of classifying a target into a non-target (type 
1 error) is greater than the opposite, since the abnormal returns generated by the target 
are forfeited. Thus, he uses a rule of minimization of type 1 errors and a high cut-off for 
his portfolio to earn the highest returns. However, his model did marginally better than 
chance alone. 
When predicting acquiring firms, the cost of a misclassification is not as high as for 
models where categorizing a future target is the purpose since the aim of this study is 
not to maximize a portfolio’s return but to create a model to pinpoint potential bidding 
firms thereby supporting the decisions of investment bankers when giving advice on 
possible acquisitions. Where, in the case of targets, a misclassification strongly impacts a 
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portfolio’s performance, it wouldn’t in the case of acquirers since they tend to have 
little to no abnormal return on the announcement date, and negative returns 
afterwards. If maximizing the portfolio returns is the goal, then the focus should clearly 
be on targets, which explains the vast literature on target prediction. This is not the 
objective here. 
 If this model is used as a support tool for investment bankers, advising a firm to make 
an acquisition while it shouldn’t (type 2 error) could have several repercussions on the 
firm’s performance, its stakeholders, and the reputation of the investment bankers. 
Inversely, passing on the opportunity of gaining an extra client when it would be advised 
to do so (type 1 error) would be costly for the investment banks and but necessarily the 
firm. However, these costs are not possible to measure. For these reasons, I report the 
model’s performance using three different cut-offs calculations, and propose that the 
model with the lowest type 2 and type 1 errors will perform the best.  
The first method to determine the cut-off probability is to use the actual fraction of 
acquirers in the estimation sample. In this case, the estimation sample consists of 4281 
acquirers in a total of 107 066 firm-years.21This gives a probability cut-off of 3.9985%, 
assuming that there should be a similar proportion of acquirers in the holdout sample. 
Results for the binary logit models presented in panel A. of table 17 are all very similar, 
although measuring the imbalance as a ratio seems a little more efficient with 1.57% of 
type 1 error against 3.28% when using the dummy variables. These results also apply to 
the multinomial logit models. When comparing the multinomial with the binary logit 
using the ratio, it is surprising to see that their performance is almost identical.  
Because the probability cut-off is very low, it is normal that the models do well in 
classifying future acquirers in the correct category, but at the cost of a high type 2 error: 
the proportion of non acquirers incorrectly classified as acquirers is consequently very 
                                                          
21
 In the case where a firm makes more than 1 acquisition in a given year, only the first deal was kept in 
the sample since the logit model doesn’t take into consideration the subsequent bids. 
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high. Using this cut-off probability, even if the error rate is high, the models still perform 
twice better than chance, which is noteworthy. 
 
Table 17: Model Performance Matrixes Using the Estimation Sample Cut-off  
These tables present the classification of each firm the models. Panel A. reports Binary logit models only while Panel 
B reports the multinomial logit as well as the 2-steps binary logit. Bolded observations correspond to correct 
classifications. Relative frequencies are reported under the actual numbers to get a better idea of the models' 
predictive power. 
            Panel A. Binary Logit Models (cutoff = 3.99%) 
    





    
Cutoff 
Probability Acq Didn't Acq Total 
 
 Acq Didn't Acq Total 
    P(A) > 
3.99% 583 6783 7366   614 7034 7648         
  7.91%*** 92.09%     8.03%*** 91.97%           
P(A)< 3.99% 52 1533 1585   4 251 255         
  3.28% 96.72%***     1.57% 98.43%***           
Total 635 8316 8949   618 7285 7903         
  7.10% 92.90%     7.82% 92.18%           
                        
                        
Panel B. Multinomial Logit And 2 steps Binary Logit Models (cutoff = 3.99%) 
                        
  Multilogit Dummy   Multilogit Ratio   Acquire Given Active 
Cutoff 
Probability Acq Didn't Acq Total    Acq Didn't Acq Total    Acq Didn't Acq Total 
P(A) > 
3.99% 588 6893 7481   613 7044 7657   611 6985 7596 
  7.86%*** 92.14%     8%*** 92%     8.04%*** 91.96%   
P(A)< 3.99% 47 1423 1470   5 241 246   7 300 314 
  3.20% 96.80%***     2.03% 97.97%***     2.23% 97.77%***   
Total 635 8316 8951   618 7285 7903   618 7285 7903 
  7.09% 92.91%     7.82% 92.18%     7.82% 92.18%   




It is important to note that the cut-off percentage of 3.99% was obtained using the 
frequency of acquirers in the entire estimation sample regardless of data availability. 
The second method used to test the model is to use the percentage of acquirers actually 
included in the samples used by the models as the probability cut-off. It is equal to the 
number of acquirers (whether they made one or several acquisitions) in the sample 
divided by the total number of firm-years in each of the models’ respective sample. 
Because some variables used in the logit regressions are missing for many firms, the 
true number of observations considered decreases sharply. Table 18 displays the results 
using different cut-offs for each model, depending on the proportion of acquirers in the 
sample that was used to estimate the probability of acquisition. The probabilities of the 
model Binary Acquire Given Active, which is the 2-step binary logit model, were 
computed from both steps of the model. First, the probability to become active in the 
takeover market (step 1) was computed and then this probability was multiplied by the 
probability to become an acquirer (step 2) given that the firm would become active. This 
model used the same sample of available data as the multinomial logit model with the 
ratios. A test on proportions indicates that the proportions of correct classifications are 
all significantly different than the actual proportions of acquirers and non-acquirers in 
the sample, at the 1% level.
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Table 18: Model Performance Matrixes Using Models' Actual Sample Cut-off 
This table summarizes the classification of each firms by  models. Panel A. reports Binary logit models only while Panel B reports the 
multinomial logit as well as the 2-steps binary logit. Bold observations correspond to correct classifications. The cut-offs for each model are 
defined by the number of acquirers divided by the total number of firm-years, both reported as well. Relative frequencies are reported 
under the actual numbers to get a better idea of the models' predictive power. 
Panel A. Binary Logit Models           
                            
Binary Dummy   Binary Ratio           
#Acquirers: 1385     #Acquirers: 1370             
#Firm-Years: 21286     #Firm-Years: 20642             
Cutoff: 6.51%     Cutoff: 6.64%             
Probability 
Cut-off 
 Acq Didn't Acq Total   
Probability 
Cut-off 
 Acq Didn't Acq Total 
          
P(A) > 6.51% 368 2984 3352   P(A) > 6.64% 376 2698 3074          
  10.98%*** 89.02%       12.23%*** 87.77%             
P(A)< 6.51% 267 5332 5599   P(A)< 6.64% 242 4587 4829          
  4.77% 95.23%***       5.01% 94.99%***             
Total 635 8316 8951   Total 618 7285 7903          
  7.09% 92.91%       7.82% 92.18%             
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*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Panel B. Multinomial Logit and 2-steps Binary Logit Models   
                            
Multinomial Logit Dummy   Multinomial Logit Ratio   Binary Acquire Given Active 
#Acquirers: 1418     #Acquirers: 1403     #Acquirers: 1403   
#Firm-Years: 21345     #Firm-Years: 20700     #Firm-Years: 20700   
Cutoff: 6.64%     Cutoff: 6.78%     Cutoff: 6.78%   
Cut-Off 
Probability 








Acq Didn't Acq Total 
P(A) > 6.64% 385 3013 3398 
 
P(A) > 6.78% 344 3273 3617 
 
P(A) > 6.78% 353 2280 2633 
 
11.33%*** 88.67% 
   
9.51%*** 90.49% 
   
13.41%*** 86.59% 
 
P(A)< 6.64% 250 5253 5553 
 
P(A)< 6.78% 274 5012 5286 
 
P(A)< 6.78% 265 5005 5270 
 
4.50% 95.5%*** 
   
5.18% 94.82%*** 
   
5.03% 94.97%*** 
 
Total 635 8266 8901 
 
Total 618 8285 8903 
 
Total 618 8285 8903 
 
7.13% 92.87% 
   
6.94% 93.06% 





From this table, we get a better idea of the differences in each model’s prediction 
ability. For the binary logit models, using the growth-resources ratio still outperforms 
the use of dummy variables. While the type 1 error is slightly higher, using a higher cut-
off reduced the type 2 error by a considerable margin: the model now correctly 
identified 12.23% of the future acquirers. As for both multinomial logit models, the 
dummy variable version clearly outperforms the ratio: 11.33% of the acquirers were 
correctly identified against 9.51%. This result is contrary to when the lower cut-off of 
the estimation sample was used. Results from the 2-steps binary model are still superior 
to those using the multinomial logit models with both lower type 1 and 2 errors. The 
insignificance of the coefficients in step 2 of the model suggests that using a 2-step 
binary model is very useful for identifying which firm will become active in the takeover 
market, but doesn’t differentiate firms becoming acquirers from targets. Once again, 
the models perform better than chance in identifying acquirers by a few percentage 
points ranging from 2.57% to 6.47%: even though these values may seem marginal, they 
represent an increase ranging from 37.03% to 93.23% in efficiency. 
At first glance, the performance of these models can seem marginal to the reader when 
compared to those in the literature. This big difference in performance is explained by 
the way the prediction abilities are computed. In prior papers, (Palepu; 1986, Powell; 
1999, Espahbodi & Espahbodi; 2003), where prediction performance of the models 
range from 46% to 63%, the method of computation of the models’ accuracy is referred 
to as the ratio of the total number of firms correctly classified over the total sample size. 
In this case, correctly predicted future acquirers and future non-acquirers over the total 
sample size would reflect the prediction performance of the models. Table 19 reports 
the models’ performance using this definition. As one can see, when using the 
estimation sample’s proportion of acquirers as the cut-off, the prediction accuracy is 
fairly low. This is due to the fact that, with such a low cut-off, most firms are classified as 
future acquirers, which explains the high type 2 errors. However, when using the actual 
proportion of acquirers in each model’s respective sample used to compute the 
aforementioned results, the models’ prediction accuracy, ranging from 60.16% to 
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63.68%, are comparable to the takeover targets prediction models of the literature. 
Using this method of performance assessment, the models using dummy variables 
outperform those using the ratio. 
Table 19. Prediction Accuracy of the Models Using the Empirical 
Definition 
This table summarizes the performance of the different models built in this study using the empirical 
definition of prediction accuracy: (Total number of correctly classified acquirers + Total number of 
correctly classified non-acquirers) / Total sample size. Panel A displays the performance for the models 
using the cut-off equal to the proportion of acquirers in the estimation sample and Panel B displays the 
performance for the model using the proportion of acquirers in their own sample used to compute the 
results. 
       
Panel A. Models Performance Using the Estimation Sample Cut-Off (3.99%) 









2 Steps Binary 
Correctly Predicted 
Acquirers 
583 614 588 613 611 
Correctly Predicted 
Non-Acquirers 
1533 251 1423 241 300 
Total Sample Size 8949 7903 8951 7903 7903 
Prediction Accuracy 23.65% 10.95% 22.47% 10.81% 11.53% 
       
Panel B. Models' Performance Using the Each Model's Own Sample 
       





2 Steps Binary 
Correctly Predicted 
Acquirers 
368 376 385 344 353 
Correctly Predicted 
Non-Acquirers 
5332 4587 5253 5012 5005 
Total Sample Size 8951 7903 8901 8903 8903 




The third method consists of dividing the samples into deciles and reporting the 
prediction ability for each of them, making it easier to pinpoint the best range of cut-off 
to use in order to minimize type 2 errors. Results from this method are reported in table 
20. Only the values for the binary logit models are reported since the results are not 
significantly different for the multinomial logit models.22 When using both the growth-
resources ratio and the dummy variables, the cut-off point with the highest proportion 
of future acquirers correctly identified is in the top deciles, ranging from ≥9.59% and 
≥9.57% for the dummy and ratio: they take values of 19.42% and 20.51% of correct 
classification, respectively. While this method of classification gives the highest 
percentage of correctly identified future acquirers, the type 1 error is still important as 
almost three quarters of the total acquirers are not correctly identified. However, it is 
still much lower than when using the cut-off values from the previous methods. 
This section shows that building a very efficient model is hard and that researchers 
always face a trade-off between both types of errors. It is also surprising that the 
multinomial models do not outperform binary logit models, which is contrary to 
Powell’s (2004) findings in his study on targets. The most surprising result is that the 2-
step binary model performs very well even though the most important variables of the 
model are statistically insignificant in the second step (identifying acquirers from a 
sample consisting of acquirers and targets exclusively). This conclusion is interesting as 
the use of the growth-resource imbalance is widely used in empirical work to predict 
targets. Results from the models reported here open the door to the hypothesis that the 
imbalance may cause a firm to become a target or an acquirer rather than a target 
exclusively. The fact that the binary models perform as well or better than the 
multinomial logit for predictions also put an emphasis on the effect of the IIA 
assumption’s violation for the latter on the predictive power of the model. 
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Table 20 : Model Performance Sensitivity to Probablity Cut-Off by Decile 
This table summarizes the estimated probability that a firm becomes an acquirer by different models. Results are reported in deciles from the 
highest estimated probability to the lowest. % of Acquirers Correctly Classified is calculated as the number of  Acquirers Correctly Classified 
over the Total Firms Classified as Acquirer .The Cumulative % of Total Acquirers Correctly Classified in the whole sample is reported in the last 
column. 
Model: Binary Logit dummy 
 






















































9.59-100% 174 722 896 19.42% 27.40%   9.57-100% 162 628 790 20.51% 26.21% 
8.06-9.59% 86 809 895 9.61% 40.94%   7.56-9.57% 75 715 790 9.49% 38.35% 
6.99-8.06% 66 829 895 7.37% 51.34%   6.93-7.56% 78 713 791 9.86% 50.97% 
6.27-6.99% 62 833 895 6.93% 61.10%   6.61-6.93% 71 719 790 8.99% 62.46% 
5.66-6.27% 55 840 895 6.15% 69.76%   6.35-6.61% 44 746 790 5.57% 69.58% 
5.19-5.66% 54 841 895 6.03% 78.27%   6.03-6.35% 37 754 791 4.68% 75.57% 
4.6-5.19% 42 853 895 4.69% 84.88%   5.63-6.03% 61 729 790 7.72% 85.44% 
4.2-4.6% 34 861 895 3.80% 90.24%   5.37-5.63% 42 748 790 5.32% 92.23% 
3.6-4.2% 50 845 895 5.59% 98.11%   5.14-5.37% 31 760 791 3.92% 97.25% 
0-3.6% 12 883 895 1.34% 100.00%   0-5.14% 17 773 790 2.15% 100.00% 
Total 635 8316 8951 
   




IX. Anticipation of the Deal and CARs 
When a firm becomes a target, there is typically an abnormal return earned over the 42 
days prior to the announcement (see Schwert; 1996) which may be attributed to 
information leakages or to market anticipation. Information leakages include insider 
information, unusual trading patterns or higher insider trading activity than usual. In 
contrast, market anticipation refers to the ability of the market to use publically 
available information to assess the likelihood of an acquisition and to trade accordingly. 
In this section, I examine the relationship between the abnormal return earned by the 
acquirer and the acquisition probability estimated by the models of this study. 
In the sample, the average CAR before the announcement date is negative, and it is only 
slightly positive around the announcement date, as shown in table 21. Post-merger 
performance is significantly negative, which is similar to that reported in most previous 
studies. Other descriptive statistics are also included in the table. An interesting fact is 
that the Eventus-computed precision weighted CAR is not statistically significant while, 
when the distribution is standardized, the Patell Z measure is significant: this shows that 












Table 21. Descriptive Statistics of Daily CARs 
This table reports the test statistics for both the daily event study (in Panel A.) and the cross-sectional daily 
event study (in Panel B.) as reported from Eventus. 















(-42,-2) 5148 2.51% 1.27% 2675:2473*** 3.846*** 6.663*** 7.010*** 
(-5,+5) 5147 1.08% 0.76% 2677:2470*** 4.439*** 5.506*** 7.080*** 
(-1,+1) 5147 0.80% 0.62% 2658:2489*** 6.991*** 7.848*** 6.549*** 
(+2,+40) 5148 -2.13% -2.30% 2397:2751 -7.158*** -5.800*** -0.752 
*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
















(-42,-2) 5148 -0.745% -2.212% 2511:2637** -0.687 -0.521% -1.735** 0.0046957 
(-5,+5) 5147 0.503% 3.194% 2642:2505** 3.297*** 0.293% 1.936** 0.002194 
(-1,+1) 5147 0.666% 6.589% 2662:2485*** 6.623*** 0.199% 2.511*** 0.0014098 
(+2,+40) 5148 -4.717% -11.518% 2285:2863*** -9.645*** -2.241% -7.639*** 0.0057074 
 *, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
As the abnormal return reflects the surprise element of an announcement, I expect to 
observe a negative relationship between the probability and the acquirer’s abnormal 
return. The CARs were computed using four different event windows (-42;-2), (-5;5), (-
1;1) and (2;40) days around the event’s announcement date and the expected 
probability was computed using the two models with the best performance and 
statistical significance. Following Malatesta and Thompson (1985) I use three different 
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models to examine the relationship between the CAR and the expected probability of 
acquisition. The first is a simple OLS regression: 
                          (10) 
where X is the vector of the deal’s characteristic which are described in table 22, which 
excludes the estimated probability of acquisition (Table 23, Panel A.). In panel B and C, 
the estimated probability of acquisition is added to the models: results using two slightly 
different equations that are used in both panels.  
The equation of the second model is the CAR expressed as: 
                                                                                                                               (11) 
where the estimated probability of acquisition P(Acq) is included in the vector of 
variables X. In the third model, the dependent variable is divided (1 – estimated P(Acq)):  
                
   
         
                ,                                      (12) 
so that the anticipated part of the total CAR (the runup in stock price) is taken into 
account in the dependent variable. By dividing by (1-P(Acq)), the CAR should be a more 
appropriate measure of the value of the deal. For example, consider a deal where the 
total cumulative abnormal return is $100M and there is a 25% probability of the deal’s 
occurrence. During the trading days leading to the announcement, $25M (25%) of the 
total gains will be incorporated in the firm’s stock price so that only a $75M gain 
materializes at announcement. Thus, by dividing the CAR at announcement, $75M by 1-
P(A), 75%, we get the whole $100M gain. The coefficients of the regressions thus reflect 
more accurately the relationship between the value of the deal and the independent 
variables. The models chosen to estimate the probabilities are: the binary logit model 
using the growth-resource ratio23 (Table 23, Panel B.) and the multinomial logit model 
(Table 23, Panel C.) using that same ratio. Results for both types of models (binary and 
multinomial logit) are reported for the ease of comparison. 
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Table 22. Description of the Variables 
  Variable Description 
Merger Wave 
Dummy Variable, equals to 1 if the year of the deal is included in 
a merger wave 
Recession 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the year of the deal is considered 
as a recession year according to the NBER 
Stock Deal 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the deal was paid for with stocks 
only 
Cash Deal 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the deal was paid for with cash 
only 
Private Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the target firm is private 
Public Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the target firm is public 
Friendly Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the takeover is friendly 
Value  Value of the deal, in Millions of $ 
Firm Size Size of the firm expressed as Ln(Total Assets) 
P(Acq) 





Table 23. OLS Results for the Anticipation of the Deal Before 
Announcement 
This table summarizes results from the three OLS regression models that predict a deal's CAR. 
Results from the first model, where the dependent variable is explained by a vector of deal 
characteristics, are reported in Panel A. The second model incorporates the estimated 
probability of acquisition in the vector of explanatory variables. The third model is computed 
by dividing the CAR by (1 - estimated probability of acquisition) so that the dependent variable 
is expressed as (CAR / 1-P(Acq)). The estimated probabilities of acquisition are computed by a 
binary logit model (Panel B.) and a multinomial logit model (Panel C.). Results from the second 
and third models are clustered together to facilitate comparison. The difference is sample size 
between Panel A. and the others is due to the lack of availability of the predicted probability of 
acquisition. 
     Panel A. CAR Excluding the Estimated Probability of Acquisition 
Window (-42;-2) (-5;5) (-1;1) (2;40) 
     
Merger Wave 0.0001 0.0017 0.0086 -0.0325 
 
(0.993) (0.774) (0.023)** (0.08) 
Recession -0.0246 -0.0176 -0.0054 -0.0384 
 
(0.356) (0.094) * (0.425) (0.25) 
StockDeal -0.0270 -0.0200 -0.0118 -0.0647 
 
(0.059)* (0) *** (0.001)*** (0) *** 
Cash Deal -0.0117 0.0092 0.0123 -0.0025 
 
(0.488) (0.164) (0.004)*** (0.906) 
 Private 0.0074 0.0012 -0.0019 0.0042 
 
(0.888) (0.955) (0.888) (0.95) 
 Public 0.0378 -0.0132 -0.0246 0.0106 
 
(0.477) (0.528) (0.069)* (0.874) 
Friendly 0.0432 0.0077 -0.0016 0.0003 
 
(0.241) (0.596) (0.867) (0.996) 
Value of Deal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.608) (0.037)** (0.017)** (0.481) 
Firm Size -0.0010 -0.0043 -0.0030 0.0112 
 
(0.742) (0.001)*** (0)*** (0.005)*** 
Intercept -0.0525 0.0315 0.0324 -0.0843 
 
(0.451) (0.252) (0.067)* (0.333) 
     
N= 3526 3525 3525 3525 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0001 0.0139 0.0303 0.0074 




Panel B. Binary Logit Model 
         
Window (-42;-2) (-5;5) (-1;1) (2;40) 
Dependent Variable CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
         
Merger Wave 0.0037 -0.0004 -0.0068 -0.0109 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0402 -0.0520 
 
(0.806) (0.979) (0.414) (0.243) (0.769) (0.901) (0.006) (0.002)*** 
Recession -0.0395 -0.0373 -0.0279 -0.0286 -0.0057 -0.0067 -0.0397 -0.0418 
 
(0.042)* (0.092) (0.009)*** (0.017)** (0.402) (0.386) (0.036)** (0.052)* 
StockDeal -0.0219 -0.0271 -0.0124 -0.0140 -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0334 -0.0397 
 
(0.174) (0.14) (0.162) (0.159) (0.496) (0.562) (0.034)** (0.026)** 
Cash Deal 0.0034 0.0093 0.0096 0.0108 0.0131 0.0154 0.0138 0.0139 
 
(0.832) (0.609) (0.272) (0.27) (0.019)** (0.014)** (0.374) (0.43) 
 Private 0.0056 0.0234 0.0052 0.0051 -0.0069 -0.0069 0.0567 0.0944 
 
(0.912) (0.686) (0.852) (0.871) (0.698) (0.732) (0.252) (0.093)* 
 Public 0.0334 0.0493 -0.0054 -0.0044 -0.0287 -0.0290 0.0633 0.1039 
 
(0.513) (0.398) (0.846) (0.889) (0.112) (0.152) (0.205) (0.067)* 
Friendly 0.0374 0.0430 0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0060 -0.0086 -0.0013 0.0010 
 
(0.332) (0.33) (0.904) (0.906) (0.66) (0.574) (0.972) (0.982) 
Value of Deal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.971) (0.576) (0.082)* (0)*** (0.046)** (0)*** (0.969) (0.738) 
Firm Size 0.0032 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0021 0.0089 0.0069 
 
(0.392) (0.845) (0.508) (0.128) (0.026)** (0.08)* (0.014)** (0.04)** 
P(Acq) -0.1058 - -0.0249 - 0.0347 - -0.0489 - 
 
(0.153) - (0.54) - (0.184) - (0.498) - 
Intercept -0.0666 -0.0764 0.0130 0.0267 0.0348 0.0354 -0.1289 -0.1624 
 
(0.324) (0.322) (0.726) (0.523) (0.145) (0.186) (0.051*) (0.031)** 
         
N= 1549 1549 1548 1549 1548 1549 1548 1549 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0021 0.0007 0.0101 0.0184 0.0234 0.028 0.0138 0.0153 





*, ** and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel C. Multinomial Logit Model 
         
Window (-42;-2) (-5;5) (-1;1) (2;40) 
Dependent Variable CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
CAR 
CAR /  1-
P(Acq) 
         
Merger Wave 0.0066 0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0072 -0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0289 -0.0404 
 
(0.654) (0.823) (0.669) (0.438) (0.69) (0.862) (0.046)** (0.014)** 
Recession -0.0401 -0.0386 -0.0264 -0.0266 -0.0050 -0.0058 -0.0423 -0.0439 
 
(0.035)** (0.075)* (0.013)** (0.026)** (0.459) (0.442) (0.023)** (0.038)** 
StockDeal -0.0223 -0.0273 -0.0157 -0.0187 -0.0051 -0.0055 -0.0333 -0.0416 
 
(0.159) (0.129) (0.076)* (0.059)* (0.364) (0.386) (0.032)** (0.018)** 
Cash Deal -0.0008 0.0044 0.0081 0.0086 0.0121 0.0141 0.0092 0.0086 
 
(0.959) (0.806) (0.355) (0.38) (0.028)** (0.023)** (0.544) (0.621) 
 Private -0.0077 0.0044 0.0028 0.0027 -0.0099 -0.0103 0.0497 0.0853 
 
(0.877) (0.938) (0.919) (0.931) (0.576) (0.602) (0.307) (0.123) 
 Public 0.0238 0.0337 -0.0089 -0.0082 -0.0324 -0.0333 0.0605 0.1009 
 
(0.636) (0.554) (0.751) (0.796) (0.069)* (0.096)* (0.218) (0.071)* 
Friendly 0.0395 0.0459 0.0040 -0.0015 -0.0064 -0.0090 0.0042 0.0073 
 
(0.296) (0.287) (0.849) (0.951) (0.635) (0.554) (0.911) (0.863) 
Value of Deal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.908) (0.571) (0.09)* (0)*** (0.044)** (0)*** (0.986) (0.855) 
Firm Size 0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0017 0.0095 0.0064 
 
(0.478) (0.852) (0.848) (0.227) (0.047)** (0.157) (0.008)*** (0.055)* 










Intercept -0.0541 -0.0603 0.0097 0.0252 0.0362 0.0370 -0.1285 -0.1558 
 
(0.414) (0.423) (0.794) (0.545) (0.124) (0.161) (0.048)** (0.034) 
         
N= 1558 1558 1557 1558 1557 1558 1557 1558 




From Panel A, the results show that the characteristics of the deal are not significantly 
related to the CAR during the run-up period. Only the dummy variable “stock” has a 
significantly negative relationship with the dependent variable for all the windows. This 
means that the market can partially anticipate an event if they suspect that the stock’s 
price is overvalued. Obviously, when the deal is announced, that signal sent by 
managers confirms the suspicions, since they are likely to use overvalued equity to 
finance the acquisition rather than cash. When cash is used, as opposed to stock as the 
means of payment, the CAR in the (-1;1) window increases, which is contrary to the view 
that managers prefer to use the firm’s resources to make value reducing deals rather 
than distribute them to shareholders. Also, given the results, it appears that bigger 
doesn’t mean better: as deal value and firm size increase, the abnormal returns 
generated by the event are expected to decrease. As deals and firms increase in size, 
assessing the true value of synergies and expected performance become more 
complicated and forecasting errors are much harder to avoid, which can explain why the 
stock price performance decreases, especially at the announcement date. On the other 
hand, for the period after the event, larger firms will tend to have higher CARs, which 
could be explained by the increased coverage by analysts and monitoring control of the 
managers. 
When controlling for the probability of making an acquisition, in Panel B and C, the 
recession dummy variable becomes significantly and negatively correlated with the deal 
CAR. If the acquisition was anticipated, one would see an increase in the run-up prior to 
the deal and a lower abnormal return at the date of announcement. However, the 
coefficients of the predicted probability estimated by both the binary and the 
multinomial logit models are negative, as expected, but aren’t significantly different 
than zero. Therefore, the interpretation of this finding is that the estimated probability 
of the models doesn’t reflect the anticipation of the market before the deal’s 
announcement, if such a deal is anticipated. 
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Because these deals may not anticipated by investors, it is not surprising to see that the 
results in both Panel B and C are not different than in Panel A. Even when we correct the 
deal’s CAR by its expected probability of occurrence, most deal characteristics still lack 
statistical significance.  
X. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The growth-resources imbalance hypothesis is generally accepted to be a good predictor 
of future targets. In this paper, the focus was the opposite: how the imbalance relates 
to the probability of becoming an acquirer for a sample of 6976 US acquirers who made 
acquisitions during the period 1995 to 2008. The growth-resource imbalance was 
hypothesized to be positively related to the probability of acquisition and was tested 
using binary, 2-step binary and multinomial logit models. This implies that high-growth, 
low resource firms and low growth, cash hungry firms would be more likely to make an 
acquisition than more “balanced” firms. 
The evidence presented showed that the majority of acquiring firms tended to 
outperform their industry peers in the 3 to 5 years prior to their first bid, which is 
consistent with the work of Bradley & Sundaram (2004). Contrary to popular belief, the 
growth component of the firm is the one driving acquisition rather than the resources. 
Using the traditional definition of resources as a combination of cash and leverage, I find 
that only growth has a positive effect on the probability to make a bid. When the 
definition of resources is relaxed to cash only, growth has a greater impact than 
resources on the probability of acquisition. As such, I find that firms with high growth 
relative to the industry median are the most likely to become bidders while those with 
low growth are the less likely. 
The growth-resources imbalance hypothesis was partially confirmed. Firms with high 
growth and low resources are the most likely to become an acquirer while firms with 
low growth and high resources, which were expected to be the most likely to acquire, 
were, in fact, less likely to make a deal. This lack of action from management to correct 
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the imbalance raises suspicions on a possible agency conflict with regards to what they 
are supposed to do in order to keep the firm balanced between a steady growth and the 
necessary resources to fuel it, and thus make it prosperous. 
From the models used, both the binary and multinomial logit models performed well in 
predicting future acquirers in the holdout sample with a success rate nearly double that 
of simple chance and a predictive accuracy ranging from 60.16% to 63.68%24. However, 
contrary to Powell (2004), the binary logit outperformed its multinomial counterpart 
with its higher prediction accuracy. This finding can partially be explained by the fact 
that the multinomial logit violates the IIA assumption, and this argument is further 
strengthened by the fact that the 2 step binary model has a much higher ability to 
correctly classify future acquirers. 
While this study adds a piece to the puzzle of acquirers in the M&A literature, it still has 
its weaknesses. The models used are simple and may not account for each element that 
affects the acquisition decisions of firms and managers. Bringing other aspects of 
corporate governance such as managerial incentives and characteristics of the board 
could also prove useful. In addition, the use of a proportional hazard model would add 
significantly to the robustness of the results by considering the time dimension in the 
model. More precisely, such a model would estimate the probability of a firm to make a 
bid given that it is not an acquirer at a given day. This dynamic model would 
complement the logit models reported in this study. For the methodology, the cut-offs 
used to define high (low) growth and high (low) resources are arbitrary and ambiguous. 
The use of a different cut-off (i.e. the top 25% of growth or resources, for example) 
could strengthen the evidence provided. These improvements, however, are left for 
future studies.  
 
 
                                                          
24
 These percentages are based on the empirical definition of predictive accuracy defined as: (% of future 
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Appendix – Robustness Checks 
This section presents all figures and tables that were not reported in the discussion part 
of the paper that are used for the sake of completeness and robustness check. First the 







Figure A-1 and A-2 plot the probability to become an acquirer computed by the binary 
logit model using  the average past 2 years sales growth and cash and short term 
investments over book value of the firm for the growth and resource components of the 
ratio, respectively. All the other variables were held constant using their mean value for 
each observation. This way, the effect of the ratio on the dependent variable is isolated. 
Both figures are similar to those computed with the multinomial logit model and no 
significant difference exists between the two. The figures represent a probability density 

















Table A.1 Growth-Resources Matrix Using Alternate 
Definitions 
In this table, the probability of firms to become an acquirer or a target is reported 
according to their growth and resources level. High (low) growth means higher 
(lower) than the industry median measured by the average last 2 years sales growth. 
In panel A. for a firm to be in the high (low) resources category, it has to have higher 
(lower) cash over total assets and lower (higher) leverage than the industry median. 
In panel B., a firm has to have lower (higher) leverage than the industry median only 
to be in the high (low) resources category. 
      Panel A. Resources defined as high (low) cash over total assets and 
















P(A): 6.77% P(A): 4.45% 




P(A): 8.89% P(A): 6.23% 
P(T): 4.37% P(T): 4.13% 
 
















P(A): 7.23%% P(A): 4.11% 




P(A): 8.86% P(A): 6.46% 
P(T): 4.48% P(T): 3.97% 
 
When the definition of resources is tightened to include both of cash and leverage, the 
results vary slightly. The high-high tier has lower probabilities to become both an 
acquirer and a target than when using cash-only as reported in the paper. In the high 
growth-low resources quadrant, results here indicate an increased probability to 
become an acquirer and a target by more than around 1.5% and 0.5% respectively. The 
other significant difference is in the low-low quadrant, where north of 6% of firms will 
become acquirers while this proportion is only 4.45% when using cash only: when 
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leverage is higher than the industry median, it has a positive effect on the probability to 
make an acquisition. However, the most prominent firms to become an acquirer are still 
in the high growth quadrants, and each quadrant retains the same order of probability 
to make an acquisition across each matrix. 
99 
 
Table A.2. Binary Logit Model for Acquirers Using the Growth-
Resources Ratio 
This table summarizes the results of the binary logit model where the dependent variable is the 
probability to become an acquirer in the next year.  Both panels summarize the results using 
alternate definitions of growth. In Panel A., growth is measured as the past growth in the firms' 
market-to-book ratio which represents the average change in expected growth from the market. 
Panel B. reports results using the definition of growth as the average past market-to-book ratio which 
represents the average anticipated growth by the market. The variable Past Growth is measured by 
the average past 2 (3) years sales growth. 


































G/R 0.0009317 0.0013333 0.0001951 0.0004833 0.0000353 -0.0001664 
  (0.061) (0.075*) (0.808) (0.661) (0.941) (0.78) 
G/R^2 -1.15E-06 -1.82E-06 -3.24E-06 -4.34E-06 -5.79E-11 -4.80E-10 
  (0.045)** (0.058)* (0.09)* (0.136) (0.639) (0.489) 
Firm Size 0.0000515 0.0000524 0.0000512 0.0000521 0.0000517 0.0000523 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth -6.96E-06 0.0000556 -6.25E-06 0.0001176 -4.29E-06 0.0003227 
  (0.829) (0.882) (0.817) (0.753) (0.859) (0.383) 
Leverage -0.008239 -0.0198273 -0.0118422 -0.0228083 -0.0108007 -0.0236223 
  (0.482) (0.172) (0.325) (0.123) (0.364) (0.108) 
Merger Wave 1.3918 collinearity 1.37577 collinearity 1.789692 collinearity 
  (0.231)   (0.236)   (0.147)   
Recession Year -0.1638202 predict -0.1666788 predict -0.1670791 predict 
  (0.038)**   (0.036)**   (0.036)**   
Intercept -2.659065 -2.641029 -2.64674 -2.631237 -2.66051 -2.642904 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 14244 9674 14028 9561 14003 9539 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ‘’Collinearity’’ means 
that the variable was found to have a multicollinearity problem and was dropped from the equation by 
the statistical package. ‘’Predict’’ means that the variable predicted successes of the dependent variable 





Panel B. Growth Measured as the Past 2 (3) Years Average Market-to-Book Ratio 
Growth 
Description 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 




















G/R 0.0003744 0.0000163 0.0011592 0.0004558 0.0001634 0.000134 
  (0.021)** (0.937) (0.001)*** (0.286) (0.062)* (0.199) 
G/R^2 -1.31E-07 -6.16E-09 -8.84E-07 -3.82E-07 6.62E-08 2.01E-08 
  (0.016)** (0.928) (0.001)*** (0.219) (0.21) (0.75) 
Firm Size 0.0000568 0.0000517 0.0000566 0.0000513 0.0000572 0.0000517 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth -2.95E-06 0.0002297 -2.85E-06 0.0002826 -2.98E-06 0.0002296 
  (0.806) (0.338) (0.809) (0.239) (0.805) (0.335) 
Leverage -0.0042902 -0.0071872 -0.0045295 -0.0096722 -0.0028251 -0.0082168 
  (0.656) (0.52) (0.645) (0.401) (0.768) (0.468) 
Merger Wave 0.2564771 1.902299 0.2440523 1.87529 0.2853377 1.926757 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Recession Year -0.1414824 -0.184444 -0.1363172 -0.1831759 -0.1263557 -0.1773268 
  (0.061)* (0.019)** (0.072)* (0.021)** (0.096)* (0.025)** 
Intercept -2.719799 -2.649518 -2.718723 -2.649127 -2.721819 -2.658323 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 19856 14575 19598 14361 19647 14456 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Results in this table summarize the probability of acquisition using alternate definitions 
of growth. The growth-resources ratio loses most of its significance when past MTB 
growth is used as a proxy for growth and it remains significant only for the 2-year period 
when using the past average market-to-book. The sign of the coefficients of the ratio 
and the ratio squared are constant across all tables and for all measures of resources as 
well. Firm size is always significantly and positively related to the probability to make a 
bid. 
An interesting difference from the table in the discussion is that the variable past 
growth (defined as average past sales growth in these tables) is not significant in any 
101 
 
regression, as opposed to when it is defined as the average past market-to-book ratio in 
the discussion table, where it is always positive and significant. Finally, I have no 
explanation for the fact that ‘’merger wave’’ and ‘’recession year’’ suffer of 
multicollinearity and perfectly predicts failures respectively when using the 3 years MTB 




















Table A.3 Binary Logit Model for Targets Using the Growth-Resources 
Ratio 
This table summarizes the results of the binary logit model where the dependent variable is the 
probability to become a target in the next year.  Both panels summarize the results using the alternate 
definitions of growth. In Panel A., growth is measured as the past 2 (3) years growth in the firm's market-
to-book ratio which represents the change in expected growth from the market. Panel B. reports results 
using the definition of growth as the average past market-to-book ratio which represents the average 
anticipated growth by the market. The variable Past Growth is measured by the average past 2 (3) years 
sales growth. 




































G/R -0.000251 0.0006573 0.0011291 0.0039979 0.0016996 0.0021727 
  (0.63) (0.485) (0.367) (0.274) (0.068)* (0.043)* 
G/R^2 8.76E-07 1.63E-07 2.30E-07 -7.43E-06 -5.01E-11 -4.47E-10 
  (0.123) (0.878) (0.935) (0.483) (0.796) (0.765) 
Firm Size -0.0000241 -0.0000282 -0.0000247 -0.0000281 -0.0000232 -0.0000263 
  (0.153) (0.158) (0.145) (0.158) (0.162) (0.179) 
Past Growth -0.0011998 -0.0035024 -0.0011718 -0.0035689 -0.000931 -0.0031096 
  (0.246) (0.128) (0.263) (0.13) (0.349) (0.181) 
Leverage 0.0203756 0.0268498 0.0226173 0.0284109 0.0230979 0.0293587 








              
Recession 
Year -0.2997192 3.609676 -0.2723559 3.600289 -0.2588945 3.612268 
  (0.089)* (0.004)*** (0.122) (0.004)*** (0.143) (0.003)*** 
Intercept -4.135325 -4.056392 -4.126241 -4.052982 -4.146241 -4.079477 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 14240 9677 14024 9564 14000 9542 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ‘’Collinearity’’ means 
that the variable was found to have a multicollinearity problem and was dropped from the equation by 
the statistical package. ‘’Predict’’ means that the variable predicted successes of the dependent variable 
perfectly and was also dropped from the equation by the software. 
103 
 
Panel B. Growth Measured as the Past 2 (3) Years Average Market-to-Book Ratio 
Growth 
Description 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 




















G/R 0.0001615 0.0003712 0.0007273 0.0009506 -0.000283 -0.0000646 
  (0.648) (0.384) (0.334) (0.303) (0.203) (0.762) 
G/R^2 -5.61E-08 -7.39E-08 -6.08E-07 -5.51E-07 -1.88E-09 1.26E-07 
  (0.61) (0.59) (0.251) (0.394) (0.989) (0.32) 
Firm Size -0.0000164 -0.0000183 -0.0000169 -0.0000183 -0.0000138 -0.0000168 
  (0.172) (0.163) (0.162) (0.163) (0.239) (0.191) 
Past Growth -0.0007683 -0.0011533 -0.0007648 -0.0011799 -0.0007986 -0.0011467 
  (0.061)* (0.076)* (0.066)* (0.082)* (0.052)* (0.077)* 
Leverage 0.0081933 0.0141844 0.0081746 0.0161332 0.0122359 0.0186536 
  (0.682) (0.534) (0.689) (0.494) (0.54) (0.409) 
Merger Wave -0.0907879 0.6772595 -0.0923519 0.681726 -0.1450315 0.692134 
  (0.542) (0.047)** (0.535) (0.046)** (0.345) (0.042)** 
Recession Year -0.231668 -0.2973962 -0.2083534 -0.2658932 -0.2220361 -0.2588985 
  (0.151) (0.089*) (0.196) (0.128) (0.172) (0.138) 
Intercept -4.107372 -4.135517 -4.110677 -4.135813 -4.117091 -4.139203 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 19856 14575 19598 14361 19647 14456 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
For the targets, results are consistent across all tables with the lack of statistical 





















*,** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
Table A.4-1 Binary Logit Model Using the Split Subsamples 
This table summarizes the results of the binary logit model ran for the 4 subsamples: high growth-high resources, high-
growth-low resources, low growth-high resources and low growth-low resources. The period of the growth component of 
the ratio is given in the table for each regression. The resources component is "Cash & Short-Term Investments/Book Value 























G/R 0.0365437 0.0232521 0.0009678 -0.0000216 0.0002404 -0.0003815 -0.0002781 -0.0019592 
  (0)*** (0.001)*** (0.177) (0.979) (0.89) (0.951) (0.794) (0.176) 
G/R^2 -0.0001742 -0.000095 -1.01E-06 -2.70E-07 6.62E-07 -0.0000135 -1.14E-06 -3.18E-06 
  (0)*** (0.066)* (0.099)* (0.661) (0.821) (0.761) (0.457) (0.422) 
Firm Size 0.0000669 0.0000595 0.0000546 0.0000439 0.0000531 0.000028 0.0000561 0.0000553 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth 0.0002556 0.0000549 0.0003008 4.73E-06 0.0002136 -0.0002194 -0.0000611 0.0009001 
  (0.532) (0.92) (0.516) (0.995) (0.747) (0.88) (0.957) (0.545) 
Leverage 0.0641959 0.044101 -0.0602013 -0.0278505 0.233954 0.1915093 -0.0545052 -0.0838025 
  (0.4) (0.507) (0.039)** (0.33) (0.121) (0.264) (0.08)* (0.039)** 
Merger Wave 0.0381298 1.296985 0.0974062 1.424951 -0.2874165 2.338945 0.222935 1.646653 
  (0.823) (0)*** (0.476) (0)*** (0.188) (0)*** (0.165) (0)*** 
Recession Year -0.4735071 -0.4518419 -0.07683 -0.1682871 -0.4294531 -0.4112248 -0.0555182 -0.0567582 
  (0.019)** (0.033)** (0.629) (0.296) (0.074)* (0.124) (0.758) (0.761) 
Intercept -2.940069 -2.700713 -2.36467 -2.253094 -2.828245 -2.88788 -2.734741 -2.608369 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
















*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table A.4-2 Binary Logit Model Using the Split Subsamples 
This table summarizes the results of the binary logit model ran for the 4 subsamples: high growth-high resources, High-
growth-low resources, low growth-high resources and low growth-low resources. The period of the growth component of 
the ratio is given in the table for each regression. The resources component is "Free Cash Flows / Total Assets". The past 























G/R 0.0022143 0.0008263 0.0000659 0.0001125 0.0009353 0.0003669 -0.0000963 -0.0001717 
  (0)*** (0.033)* (0.669) (0.539) (0.141) (0.599) (0.616) (0.438) 
G/R^2 -1.25E-06 -2.39E-07 1.06E-07 2.88E-08 3.57E-08 1.19E-07 1.14E-07 3.82E-08 
  (0.002)*** (0.335) (0.26) (0.801) (0.924) (0.761) (0.335) (0.779) 
Firm Size 0.0000848 0.0000696 0.0000546 0.0000442 0.0000527 0.0000292 0.0000575 0.0000562 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0.014)** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth 0.0003856 0.0002015 0.0002222 -0.0000155 0.000347 -0.0002674 -0.0000596 0.0010064 
  (0.285) (0.687) (0.633) (0.982) (0.613) (0.863) (0.957) (0.493) 
Leverage 0.1118082 0.0714649 -0.0655634 -0.0303371 0.2121755 0.1823512 -0.0549899 -0.0819061 
  (0.185) (0.315) (0.027)** (0.291) (0.13) (0.273) (0.076)* (0.043)** 
Merger Wave 0.3576294 1.851917 0.1405361 1.480379 -0.2493335 2.26386 0.2501779 1.579812 
  (0.026)** (0)*** (0.302) (0)*** (0.253) (0)*** (0.118) (0)*** 
Recession Year -0.2761709 -0.3846699 -0.0778653 -0.1984879 -0.3672307 -0.3748057 -0.0589486 -0.0798415 
  (0.164) (0.067)* (0.626) (0.219) (0.128) (0.161) (0.744) (0.668) 
Intercept -2.654796 -2.498941 -2.347252 -2.272364 -2.85606 -2.923511 -2.804205 -2.724935 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 




This table summarizes the results of the regressions when the samples are divided into 
quadrants defined by the growth and resources levels of the firms. The subsamples are 
the same across each table and the difference between them is the definition of 
resources in the ratio used. In table A.4-1, resources is defined as ‘’cash and short-term 
investments / book value of the firm’’ while it is ‘’free cash flows / total assets’’ in table 
A.4-2. 
Once again, the results are similar for each definition of resources as only the high 
growth-high resource quadrant yields significant results while the ratios are mostly 
insignificant for other subsamples. Firm size is positively related to acquisition, and the 
puzzling inflated coefficient of ‘’merger wave’’ for the 3 years growth period is still 














Table A.5-1 Binary Logit Model and the Probability to Be Active 
This table summarizes the results of the logit regressions on the probability of a firm to become 
active in the takeover market (as an acquirer or a target). Panel A. summarizes the results when 
growth is measured as the ''average past growth in the market-to-book ratio'' (2 and 3 years), 
while Panel B. displays the results when it is defined as the ''average past market-to-book'' for the 
2 and 3 years period. Past growth is defined by the average past 2 (3) years sales growth. 
Panel A. Past Average  Growth of Market-to-Book Ratio 































G/R 0.0005049 0.0011374 0.0004695 0.0010707 0.0003693 0.0003636 
  (0.171) (0.057)* (0.487) (0.283) (0.399) (0.547) 
G/R^2 -4.48E-07 -1.14E-06 -2.28E-06 -4.00E-06 -1.42E-07 -1.40E-06 
  (0.278) (0.115) (0.147) (0.135) (0.877) (0.299) 
Firm Size 0.0000469 0.0000474 0.0000466 0.0000471 0.0000473 0.0000474 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth -0.0000169 -0.000191 -9.01E-06 -0.0001383 -0.0000319 -0.0001768 
  (0.93) (0.617) (0.848) (0.718) (0.894) (0.633) 
Leverage -0.0028733 -0.0110359 -0.0057461 -0.0137108 -0.0035776 -0.0125796 
  (0.787) (0.403) (0.602) (0.312) (0.742) (0.352) 
Merger Wave 1.197258 Collinearity 1.184352 Collinearity 1.59396 Collinearity 
  (0.302)   (0.307)   (0.196)   
Recession Year -0.1838889 1.362414 -0.1798861 1.361831 -0.1742965 1.371964 
  (0.012)** (0.269) (0.014)** (0.27) (0.018)*) (0.266) 
Intercept -2.452313 -2.422945 -2.440983 -2.413603 -2.460884 -2.425031 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 14244 9677 14028 9564 14131 9619 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ‘’Collinearity’’ means 
that the variable was found to have a multicollinearity problem and was dropped from the equation by 
the statistical package. ‘’Predict’’ means that the variable predicted successes of the dependent variable 






Panel B. Past Average Market-to-Book Ratio 
    
Growth 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 



















G/R 0.0003413 0.0000616 0.0010903 0.0005136 0.0001091 0.0000607 
  (0.023)** (0.745) (0.001)*** (0.194) (0.184) (0.515) 
G/R^2 -1.18E-07 -1.11E-08 -8.33E-07 -3.86E-07 5.55E-08 5.00E-08 
  (0.017)** (0.858) (0.001)*** (0.173) (0.267) (0.376) 
Firm Size 0.0000524 0.0000475 0.0000522 0.0000472 0.000053 0.0000478 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth -4.87E-06 0.0000595 -4.62E-06 0.0001115 -4.91E-06 -5.77E-06 
  (0.782) (0.802) (0.78) (0.64) (0.782) (0.79) 
Leverage -0.0017275 -0.0037028 -0.0019776 -0.0055862 0.0001663 -0.0035415 
  (0.845) (0.719) (0.826) (0.598) (0.985) (0.729) 
Merger Wave 0.1962352 1.847605 0.1855374 1.824018 0.2168981 1.901843 
  (0.001)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Recession Year -0.1519142 -0.1981508 -0.1432275 -0.1918677 -0.1364168 -0.1748543 
  (0.028)** (0.006)*** (0.04)** (0.009)*** (0.05)** (0.016)** 
Intercept -2.497944 -2.440924 -2.497518 -2.440896 -2.501219 -2.453254 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 19856 14575 19598 14361 19647 14622 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Results for the regressions on the probability to be active are consistent across all 
definitions of growth both in the discussion and the appendix. The main difference is the 
variable past growth, defined in table A.5-1 as the average past sales growth is not 
significant in both panels. In the discussion table, when it is defined as the past average 
market-to-book ratio, the results are significant and positive, once again meaning that 
the market can partially anticipate an event such as an acquisition. 
For the dummy variables controlling for merger waves and recessions, results from both 
panels are much different. In panel A, results from ‘’Merger Wave’’ are insignificant or 
were dropped due to multicollinearity while ‘’Recession’’ is only significant for the 2-
year growth period. On the other hand, results from panel B are consistent with those in 




Table A.5-2 Binary Logit Model on the Probability to Become an 
Acquirer Given the Probability to be Active. 
This table summarizes the results of the second step of the 2-steps logit regressions for the 
probability of a firm to become an acquirer given the probability to be active (reported in table 
A.5-1) in the takeover market.  Panel A. summarizes the results when growth is measured as the 
past variation in the market-to-book ratio (2 and 3 years), while Panel B. displays the results when 
it is defined as the ''average past market-to-book'' for the 2 and 3 years period. The variable Past 
Growth is defined by the average past 2 (3) years sales growth.  
Panel A. Past Average  Growth of Market-to-Book Ratio 































G/R 0.00102 0.0001562 -0.000995 -0.0023995 -0.0014911 -0.0047087 
  (0.15) (0.888) (0.497) (0.333) (0.146) (0.072) 
G/R^2 -1.73E-06 -1.15E-06 -3.58E-06 -5.65E-07 -1.94E-06 4.19E-06 
  (0.025)** (0.396) (0.28) (0.937) (0.37) (0.479) 
Firm Size 0.0001442 0.0001217 0.0001432 0.0001183 0.0001442 0.0001215 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth 0.0041917 0.0108962 0.0038466 0.0112185 0.0039093 0.0125661 
  (0.06)* (0.006)*** (0.08)* (0.005)*** (0.084)* (0.003)*** 
Leverage -0.0124649 -0.0376883 -0.0274847 -0.0482071 -0.0285288 -0.0564878 
  (0.663) (0.317) (0.337) (0.176) (0.308) (0.116) 
Merger Wave Predicts Collinearity Predicts Collineartiy Predicts Collineartiy 
              
Recession 
Year 
0.0361262 Predicts -0.0051623 Predicts -0.0121706 Predicts 
  (0.856)   (0.979)   (0.951)   
Intercept 1.298903 1.216009 1.320103 1.233136 1.324821 1.215479 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 1222 888 1213 882 1208 877 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ‘’Collinearity’’ means 
that the variable was found to have a multicollinearity problem and was dropped from the equation by 
the statistical package. ‘’Predict’’ means that the variable predicted successes of the dependent variable 





Panel B. Past Average Market-to-Book Ratio 
    
Growth 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 
Avg 3 Years 
MTB 
Avg 2 Years 
MTB 



















G/R 0.0000943 -0.0005662 0.0001411 -0.001016 0.0006467 0.0002201 
  (0.844) (0.315) (0.894) (0.435) (0.042) (0.349) 
G/R^2 -3.93E-08 1.28E-07 -8.93E-08 4.86E-07 3.03E-07 -5.49E-08 
  (0.781) (0.463) (0.895) (0.577) (0.177) (0.711) 
Firm Size 0.0001269 0.0000998 0.0001265 0.0000976 0.0001217 0.0000959 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Past Growth 0.004032 0.0062096 0.0040961 0.0062578 0.0039473 0.0062285 
  (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
Leverage -0.005885 -0.0115344 -0.0068437 -0.0179064 -0.0070333 -0.0197164 
  (0.819) (0.68) (0.789) (0.532) (0.782) (0.478) 
Merger Wave 0.0741604 0.2775271 0.0593922 0.2583818 0.1311649 0.2843125 
  (0.678) (0.451) (0.741) (0.484) (0.474) (0.441) 
Recession Year -0.0323034 -0.0380518 -0.0567618 -0.065385 -0.0423531 -0.0703258 
  (0.858) (0.846) (0.755) (0.739) (0.817) (0.72) 
Intercept 1.269787 1.35948 1.277019 1.365429 1.261148 1.342056 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 1801 1420 1790 1410 1777 1407 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
These tables report the results of the regressions of the second step of the 2-step binary 
logit model testing the probability to make an acquisition given the probability to 
become active in the takeover market. No significant difference exists between the 
different definitions of growth: except firm size and past growth, most results are 
insignificant. Results for past growth in table A.5-2 are the only one to provide 
significance in predicting the probability of acquisition from the average past sales 
growth. While this can be a simple anomaly, it is still interesting to observe that, using a 
sample of future acquirers and future targets exclusively, the level of past sales growth 
is strongly and positively related to the probability to make a bid. 
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Table A.6 Multinomial Logit and Probit Models Using Dummy 
Variables 
This table summarizes the results from the multinomial logit and probit models using dummy 
variables to define growth and resources. The dummy variable High Growth takes a value of 1 if a 
firm’s growth, measured as the average past 2 years sales growth is higher than the industry 
median. The dummy variable High Cash, measured as cash and short term investments over total 
assets is also equal to 1 if it is greater than the industry median. The dummy variable Low 
Leverage takes a value of 1 if the firm's leverage is lower than the industry median. The variable 
past growth is the average MTB for the past period identified for each column. Results from the 
logit models are the same as reported in discussion part of the paper. They are displayed here for 
the ease of comparison with the probit model. 
Model Logit Probit 
Variable Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
High Growth 0.4501954 0.1725072 0.3011444 0.122304 
  (0)*** (0.153) (0)*** (0.05**) 
High Cash 0.093586 0.0272758 0.0673934 0.0235948 
  (0.094*) (0.83) (0.082*) (0.721) 
Low Leverage -0.313069 -0.5535483 -0.2179882 -0.3075684 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
Firm Size 0.0000534 -0.0000145 0.0000432 -4.60E-07 
  (0)*** (0.316) (0)*** (0.946) 
Growth (MTB) 0.0248566 0.0127377 0.0183175 0.0089902 
  (0)*** (0.075*) (0)*** (0.021**) 
Merger Wave 0.1770498 0.0886396 0.0928109 0.0663811 
  (0.005***) (0.556) (0.041**) (0.397) 
Recession -0.1886495 -0.0681559 -0.1371544 -0.0517333 
  (0.011**) (0.676) (0.007***) (0.539) 
Intercept -2.911022 -4.166654 -2.29128 -2.964834 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 21877 21877 21877 21877 
 
# Acquirers=1661 # Targets=291 # Acquirers=1661 # Targets=291 
*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
This table exposes the differences in results from the multinomial logit and multinomial 
probit models with the purpose of facilitating the comparison between both. The 
coefficients always have the same sign and similar significance. The relationship of the 
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independent variables on the dependent variable is always weaker for the probit model. 
This model also reports a significantly positive link between higher growth than the 
industry median and the probability to become a target, although weaker than to 
become an acquirer. Except from this coefficient, results are essentially the same and 

























Table A.7 Multinomial Logit Model Using the Growth-
Resources Ratio 
This table summarizes the results of the multinomial logit model using the growth-
resource ratio. Panel A. summarizes the results when resources is defined as "Free Cash 
Flows / Totals Assets" and Panel B., when it is defined as "Cash / Total Assets". The 
growth component of the growth-resources ratio is identified in the first row. The 
variable Past Growth is the average market-to-book ratio for the period identified for 
each column by the growth variable. 
Panel A. Resources defined as "Free Cash Flows / Total Assets". 
Growth 
2 Years Sales 
Growth 
2 Years Sales 
Growth 
3 Years Sales 
Growth 
3 Years Sales 
Growth 
Resources 
Free Cash Flows / 
Total Assets 
Free Cash Flows 
/ Total Assets 
Free Cash Flows 
/ Total Assets 
Free Cash Flows 
/ Total Assets 
  Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
G/r 0.0000185 -0.0000423 0.0000333 -0.0000197 
  (0.009)*** (0.011)** (0.001)*** (0.453) 
G/R ^2 1.57E-11 -2.72E-10 -2.32E-10 -6.07E-10 
  (0.509) (0.199) (0.605) (0.623) 
Firm Size 0.0000539 -7.01E-06 0.000048 -3.66E-06 
  (0)*** (0.601) (0)*** (0.786) 
Growth 0.0268844 0.0131892 0.0241577 0.0146445 
  (0)*** (0.064)* (0)*** (0.116) 
Leverage -0.0051833 0.0093697 -0.0100053 0.0185692 
  (0.577) (0.647) (0.35) (0.42) 
Merger Wave 0.1831975 0.053553 1.824991 1.263467 
  (0.004)*** (0.732) (0)*** (0)*** 
Recession -0.1892019 -0.0437679 -0.2254367 -0.1073377 
  (0.012)** (0.791) (0.004) (0.549) 
Intercept -2.740723 -4.319713 -2.671505 -4.338767 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 
N= 21277 21277 16023 16023 
  # Acquirers=1658 # Targets=280 # Acquirers=1342 # Targets=211 






Panel B. Resources defined as "Cash / Total Assets". 
Growth 
2 Years Sales 
Growth 
2 Years Sales 
Growth 
3 Years Sales 
Growth 
3 Years Sales 
Growth 
Resources 
Cash / Total 
Assets 
Cash / Total 
Assets 
Cash / Total 
Assets 
Cash / Total 
Assets 
  Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
G/r 0.0000179 0.0000429 0.0000181 7.03E-06 
  (0.147) (0.124) (0.252) (0.841) 
G/R ^2 -4.73E-10 -9.77E-10 -5.06E-10 -1.03E-10 
  (0.035)** (0.137) (0.088)** (0.852) 
Firm Size 0.0000536 -9.72E-06 0.0000478 -5.00E-06 
  (0)*** (0.48) (0)*** (0.715) 
Growth 0.0267295 0.0130162 0.0240653 0.0142101 
  (0)*** (0.065)* (0)*** (0.126) 
Leverage -0.0043971 0.0061913 -0.00892 0.0158205 
  (0.633) (0.761) (0.398) (0.49) 
Merger Wave 0.1609187 0.0881744 1.788395 1.222392 
  (0.012)** (0.561) (0)*** (0)*** 
Recession -0.1938925 -0.0709109 -0.2237863 -0.1496428 
  (0.009)*** (0.665) (0.004)*** (0.404) 
Intercept -2.737278 -4.297191 -2.670995 -4.319392 
  (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** (0)*** 








*, ** and *** denote statistical level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Results from the multinomial logit models using the growth-resources ratio are reported 
in Table A.7. The definition of resources is different in Panel A. and Panel B. and the 
variable Past Growth remains the average past sales growth. In panel A., results are 
consistent with those in the discussion part of the paper, except that the ratio squared 
is insignificantly different than zero. However, when the empirical definition of 
resources is used (cash and short term investments / total assets) in panel B, the 
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coefficients from the growth-resources ratio become insignificant. Other than that, 







Table A.8 Models' Performance by Decile 
This table summarizes the estimated probability that a firm become an acquirer by different models. It is the continuation of table 20 that is reported here since 
the results were essentially the same across all models. Results are reported in deciles from the highest probability to the lowest.% of Acquirers Correctly 
Classified is calculated as the number of  Acquirers Correctly Classified over the Total Firms Classified as Acquirer. The Cumulative % of Total Acquirers Correctly 
Classified in the whole sample is reported in the last column. 
Model : 2 Steps Binary Logit 
 


















































9.97-100% 161 629 790 20.38% 26.05% 
 
9.66-100% 179 716 895 20.00% 28.19% 
7.64-9.97% 80 710 790 10.13% 39.00% 
 
8.2-9.66% 95 800 895 10.61% 43.15% 
6.92-7.64% 75 716 791 9.48% 51.13% 
 
7.16-8.2% 69 826 895 7.71% 54.02% 
6.55-6.92% 76 714 790 9.62% 63.43% 
 
6.48-7.16% 51 844 895 5.70% 62.05% 
6.27-6.55% 42 748 790 5.32% 70.23% 
 
5.78-6.48% 66 829 895 7.37% 72.44% 
5.94-6.27% 36 755 791 4.55% 76.05% 
 
5.29-5.78% 44 851 895 4.92% 79.37% 
5.49-5.94% 59 731 790 7.47% 85.60% 
 
4.71-5.29% 32 863 895 3.58% 84.41% 
5.19-5.49% 42 748 790 5.32% 92.39% 
 
4.29-4.71% 40 855 895 4.47% 90.71% 
4.94-5.19% 31 760 791 3.92% 97.41% 
 
3.65-4.29% 43 853 896 4.80% 97.48% 
0-4.94% 16 774 790 2.03% 100.00% 
 
0-3.65% 16 879 895 1.79% 100.00% 
Total 618 7285 7903     
 
Total 635 8316 8951     
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9.45-100% 161 629 790 20.38% 26.05% 
7.49-9.45% 77 713 790 9.75% 38.51% 
6.89-7.49% 77 714 791 9.73% 50.97% 
6.58-6.89% 73 717 790 9.24% 62.78% 
6.34-6.58% 41 749 790 5.19% 69.42% 
6.02-6.34% 42 749 791 5.31% 76.21% 
5.63-6.02% 57 733 790 7.22% 85.44% 
5.38-5.63% 41 749 790 5.19% 92.07% 
5.17-5.38% 33 758 791 4.17% 97.41% 
0-5.17% 16 774 790 2.03% 100.00% 




Table A.9 reports the remaining models’ performances by deciles that were not included in the discussion because of redundancy. 
As one can see, the models behave essentially the same: around 20% of the firms are correctly classified as acquirers in the first 
deciles and then the proportion decreases substantially in the next deciles. 
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